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Schmidt: Beyond the Green: The Legal Land Use Controls Involved with Golf

BEYOND THE GREEN: THE LEGAL LAND USE CONTROLS
INVOLVED WITH GOLF COURSE CLOSURES

I. THE DRIVING RANGE OF ISSUES: AN INTRODUCTION ON FUTURE
LAND USE PLANNING FOR DEAD GOLF COURSES
Behind the façade of manicured lawns and open vistas lies a
grim truth about the state of golf – its demise in popularity.1 More
accurately, the sport is falling victim to a mismatch in supply and
demand between venues for play and willing players.2 According to
the National Golf Foundation, golf course closures have outnumbered openings since 2006.3 In the late 1980s, golf surged in popularity for a solid twenty years, a period of time that saw over four
thousand new courses around the country.4 Yet, the 2000s brought
a downfall in regular players, equipment sales, ratings, and annual
number of rounds played.5 Prominent golf industry executives
trust that the sport’s passionate adherents will keep the game
strong in the future, though they note challenges to overcome, particularly, rising costs, time commitments, financial and environmental sustainability, and accessibility to all.6
1. See Nolan Gray, Dead Golf Courses Are the New NIMBY Battlefield, BLOOMBERG
CITYLAB (June 8, 2018, 8:21 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-06-08/dead-golf-courses-are-the-new-nimby-battlefield [https://perma.cc/
MXL2-3TXU] (“Golf is dying, many experts say.”).
2. See Jason Scott Deegan, A depressing Deegan’s Dozen: Obituaries of the best golf
courses to close in 2018, G O L F A D V I S O R (Dec. 28, 2018), https://
www.golfadvisor.com/articles/a-depressing-deegans-dozen-obituaries-of-the-bestgolf-courses-to-close-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/H7XA-6JM2] (highlighting trend
in late 2010s of golf course closures).
3. See NGF’s 2019 Golf Industry Report Overview, NAT’L GOLF FOUND. (Apr.
2019), https://www.thengfq.com/2019/04/ngf-releases-2019-golf-industry-report/
[https://perma.cc/HKQ8-7SN5] (noting closure of about two hundred golf
courses year prior).
4. See Phoebe Petrovic, There Aren’t Enough Golfers To Keep All Of The U.S.
Courses In Business, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 5, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/
06/05/730057491/there-arent-enough-golfers-to-keep-all-of-the-u-s-courses-in-business [https://perma.cc/EW5S-9VB6] (stating National Golf Foundation’s encouragement “to build a course a day for 10 years”).
5. See Gray, supra note 1 (attributing downfall to “one-two punch of recession
and bad press” surrounding Tiger Woods in 2009).
6. See Erik Matuszewski, The State Of Golf For 2019 — An Industry Roundtable,
FORBES (May 1, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikmatuszewski/2019/05/
01/the-state-of-the-golf-industry-for-2019/#676b93fa5208 [https://perma.cc/
BX4C-PTYP] (identifying change in perception from game for only high-society
players to game for all).
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However, this trend of closures may not quite mean the worst
for invested property owners.7 Last year provided a rather strange
situation for the game, in which its popularity surged due to
COVID-19-related mandates of social distancing and working from
home, which left people around the country with open schedules
and a craving for outdoor socializing.8 Yet, uncertainty lingers as to
whether the coronavirus-influenced revival of the sport will prove
long-lasting.9 Prior to the pandemic, the golf industry attempted to
market itself to a new generation of golfers by transforming the
traditional culture of the sport into a wholly different experience,
for example, through the Topgolf entertainment franchise.10
However, these attempts do not point to an assured sustainable future for the sport itself, as players continue to struggle with the affordability and time commitment that golf demands.11 If these
obstacles remain still after the COVID-19 pandemic, golf course
owners may consider the option of ceasing operations and selling
the property to escape financial downfall, especially if the course is
in decent shape.12 In other instances where the course is in worse
condition, the decision to repurpose the course may not necessarily
belong to the golf property owner.13
7. See NGF’s 2019 Golf Industry Report Overview, supra note 3 (stating “soaring
real estate values” and remaining facilities’ “stronger financial health”).
8. See Dylan Dethier, How is the coronavirus changing golf’s future?, GOLF.COM
(May 27, 2020), https://golf.com/news/golf-future-coronavirus-changing/
[https://perma.cc/NE65-P86] (noting quick succession of golf course re-openings
following initial pandemic-related closures).
9. See id. (posing questions of lost revenue from closures, travel restrictions,
tight municipal budgets, and de-urbanization).
10. See generally Frequently Asked Questions, TOPGOLF, https://topgolf.com/us/
faq/ [https://perma.cc/GN8S-KZZL] (last visited Jan. 6, 2021) (describing entertainment features of Topgolf experience); see Millennial Golfers: 16 Ways to Target
Young People and Get Them Playing Your Golf Course, LIGHTSPEED (June 26, 2019),
https://www.lightspeedhq.com/blog/12-things-millennial-golfers-want/ [https://
perma.cc/PP2E-UK8Z] (suggesting marketing strategies to increase popularity of
golf in millennial generation).
11. See Karl Taro Greenfeld, The Death of Golf, MEN’S J. (June 2015), https://
www.mensjournal.com/features/the-death-of-golf-20150625/ [https://perma.cc/
M3CP-5R9P] (noting attempts to rescue golf “by making the game faster, cheaper,
and easier to play have all taken on an air of desperation”).
12. See Larry Hirsh, Considerations when Selling a Golf Property, GOLF PROP. ANALYSTS (May 24, 2017), https://golfprop.com/uncategorized/considerations-whenselling-a-golf-property/ [https://perma.cc/C2UG-VVKN] (identifying necessary
remedial steps and due diligence before selling golf property, considering “the
plethora of golf properties on the market”).
13. See, e.g., Eminent Domain Might be the 19th Hole for the Willow Ridge Country
Club, SANCHEZ & POLOVETSKY, PLLC (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.spnylaw.com/
legal-blog/eminent-domain-might-be-the-19th-hole-for-the-willow-ridge-countryclub [https://perma.cc/Y23A-LP2E] (reporting town’s intention to invoke eminent domain on golf course, competing with private developers also approaching
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As the golf industry continues navigating its uncertain future,
local governments and private owners must face the inevitable
death of some golf courses.14 Golf operations will likely cease
through government or developer buy-outs, or perhaps through
owner sell-outs.15 In other situations, the golf course has already
been left behind with its upkeep responsibilities neglected.16 Regardless of how it occurs, more communities are left with closures,
condemnations, and abandonments.17
As applied to these forms of golf course fatalities, this Comment will explore the interplay of three fundamental concepts of
property law – takings, zoning, and covenants – and how they impose or mitigate obstacles in repurposing golf courses.18 The purpose of this Comment is not to debate whether government should
interfere with private property rights of golf course owners, nor
does this Comment serve to advocate for specific post-closure uses
of golf course property.19 Instead, this Comment will inform of the
government’s available legal tools when a golf course quits operations, and aim to determine how such tools may strike a balance in
providing overall net benefit to the surrounding community while
achieving equitable results for the populations particularly impacted.20 Nonetheless, the policy and ethical questions involved
owner); see also Mark Lungariello & Mike Dougherty, Harrison eyes eminent domain
for Willow Ridge Country Club, L O H U D . C O M (Nov. 14, 2020), https://
www.lohud.com/story/news/local/westchester/harrison/2020/10/30/harrisonnew-york-ny-willow-ridge-country-club/6083191002/ [https://perma.cc/LY59RS2Q] (describing financial instability of course and noting past government takeover attempt). For further discussion of eminent domain and takings jurisprudence, see infra notes 51-102 and accompanying text.
14. See generally Gold and COVID-19: Latest news on course operations, GOLF ADVISOR (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.golfadvisor.com/covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/
8X84-PEB3] (updating COVID-19-related closures).
15. For further discussion on an example of problems associated with golf
course ownership transfer, see infra notes 199-211 and accompanying text.
16. For further discussion of an abandoned golf course in Arizona tangled in
ongoing litigation, see infra notes 199-211 and accompanying text.
17. For further discussion on a distinction between types of golf course closures, see infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
18. For further discussion of three land use controls’ effectiveness in golf closures, see infra notes 212–294 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Celeste M. Hammond, Repurposing Golf Courses and Other Amenities
That Burden the Land: Covenants Running Forever - A Transactional Perspective, 512
UIC JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 603, 605 (2019) (“This article focuses on the changes
in using land restricted to golf courses that now need repurposed uses . . . .”); see
also Lauren Sewell, Golf Course Land Positive Effects on the Environment, 9 SEATTLE J.
ENVTL. L. 329, 331-32 (2019) (advocating for wildlife protection and water
conservation).
20. See, e.g., Eddie A. Perez, The Importance of Eminent Domain in Community
Development Projects, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 109, 112, 120 (2006) (arguing eminent
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may incidentally overlap with inquiries of the appropriate level of
government interference with private property rights or of the best
repurposed golf course land use.21 Further, this Comment focuses
on government action as a necessary solution, implying generally
that local governments are more likely to achieve this balance
through informed zoning and takings decisions rather than private
individuals performing covenants.22
Section II of this Comment provides the broad legal framework
behind the three relevant property law concepts, with its highest
focus towards government takings.23 This overview looks at how
state courts have applied these principles of law to golf course controversies, either where courses have been closed by government
action or where government acts in response to closures.24 Further,
Section II will summarize the ethical theories involved when interests and benefits conflict between private landowners and the general public, for which golf serves as an arena of discord.25 Section
domain as way for government officials to maintain accountability to constituents
by requiring property transfers to represent “ideas, passions, and sentiments of the
general population” while recognizing private individuals “making the ultimate
sacrifice for the greater good”); see also Urban Institute Policy Debates, Land Use
Regulation: What’s It Worth Anyway?, URB. INST., https://www.urban.org/debates/
land-use-regulation-whats-it-worth-anyway [https://perma.cc/MZJ7-8T95] (last visited Mar. 1, 2021) (weighing zoning’s undesired effects in restricting individuals
and businesses and in exacerbating social inequality, with benefits in flexibility and
adaptability that allow “people to shape the communities in which they live, work,
and play”). For further discussion on the balance of public policy and ethical solutions, see supra notes 212-294 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Jedediah B. Forkner, Is the Illinois Equity in Eminent Domain Act
Truly Equitable?, 83 CHI. KENT L. REV. 995, 1014 (2008) (describing failure of states
to adequately define “blight” warranting government interference through eminent domain, with many definitions “based on vague concepts such as dilapidation, obsolescence, and lack of community planning”); Adele Peters, Need land for
parks and housing? There are plenty of useless golf courses to repurpose, FAST COMPANY
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90315242/need-land-for-parks-and
-housing-there-are-plenty-of-useless-golf-courses-to-repurpose (identifying competing interests in parks, conservation, residential development, affordable housing,
versus stereotypically wealthy golf course neighbors who oppose development in
their backyards).
22. See American Planning Association Chapter Delegate Assembly, APA Policy
Guide on Takings, AM. PLANNING ASS’N (Apr. 11, 1995), https://www.planning.org/
policy/guides/adopted/takings.htm [https://perma.cc/QYB2-CAJR] (describing
taking and zonings as form of “police power” where government may “intervene in
private activity to protect the public health, safety and welfare”).
23. For further discussion of United States Supreme Court case law on takings, zonings, and covenants, see infra notes 51-137 and accompanying text.
24. For further discussion on state court treatment of issues, see infra notes
51-137 and accompanying text.
25. For further discussion on an overview of philosophical and political issues
posed by golf course ownership and operations, see infra notes 138-167 and accompanying text.
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III introduces current golf course controversies that Section IV will
analyze using the principles of law and ethics to ultimately recommend a strategy of government involvement in repurposing dead
courses.26
By synthesizing three common land use controls with basic ethical and community considerations, this Comment will attempt to
answer a million-dollar putt of a question: which means works the
best?27 In other words, which legal tools are most instrumental in
achieving the best outcome for the community when a golf course
dies?28 There is no hole-in-one answer, as much depends on the
factual scenarios of each course closure plus the underlying social,
political, and ethical tensions between the concerned populations.29 Each tool serves different purposes generally, though combinations of other public policy practices can enhance their
effectiveness.30 In consideration of those varying factors that ultimately point towards the end goal of community improvement, this
Comment advocates for courts to maintain their deference towards
the government action.31 As follows, government should invoke
eminent domain foremost where possible to acquire the dead
courses, and secondarily repurpose the land through rezoning and
upholding covenants to the extent practicable.32
II. TEEING UP THE BALL: A BACKGROUND ON GOLF COURSE
CLASSIFICATION, PROPERTY LAW, AND PHILOSOPHY OF
LAND USE
At the outset, it is vital to understand the distinction between
closed, condemned, and abandoned golf courses to properly visual26. For further discussion of current case studies in Ohio, South Carolina,
and Arizona, see infra notes 173-211 and accompanying text. For further discussion of suggestions of best public policy for land use control uses on dead courses,
see infra notes 212-294 and accompanying text.
27. For further discussion on a summary of rationale behind conclusion, see
infra notes 295-303 and accompanying text.
28. For further discussion on the distinctions among eminent domain, rezoning, and covenant issues simplified, see infra notes 295-300 and accompanying text.
29. For further discussion of community tensions, see infra notes 161-167 and
accompanying text.
30. For further discussion of benefits and drawbacks of each tool, see infra
notes 173-294 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Boulders at Strafford, LLC v. Town of Strafford, 153 N.H. 633,
639 (2006) (presuming reasonableness of zoning ordinances and requiring only
rational basis for legislation). But see Schumacher v. Town of E. Hampton, N.Y.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 849 N.Y.S.2d 72, 74 (2007) (finding zoning board “improperly succumbed to community pressure”).
32. For further discussion of ideal strategy of government involvement in
repurposing dead courses, see infra notes 273-281 and accompanying text.
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ize the land use controls involved.33 Closed courses would include
those that shut down permanently due to decreased revenue or decline in demand.34 Abandoned courses are similar in that golf activities have ceased at the site likely due to similar causes, but there
may be an added element of lack of maintenance for an extended
period of time.35 Condemned courses, on the other hand, receive
their designation specifically from government condemnation proceedings, which opens the golf course to acquisition by eminent
domain.36 Abandoned and closed golf courses lend to better case
studies for land use restrictions like zoning and restrictive covenants, whereas condemned golf courses lend directly to analyses of
government takings.37 For the sake of consistency however, this
Comment will hereinafter refer to all three categories collectively as
‘dead courses.’38
In order to identify the legal tools available when faced with a
dead golf course, the owner’s identity is a first-matter inquiry.39 Depending on the golf course’s ownership, different legal obligations
flow, and this Comment touches upon three types of ownership
schemes.40 First, as their name suggests, municipal golf courses exist under local governmental ownership, maintenance, and opera33. See Katherine M. Conners, Case Note: Property—Cities Gone Wild: The Expanding Definition of a Taking under Urban Renewal Projects—Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1465, 1480 (2006) (noting property may be
condemned, but plan for which property was condemned may also be abandoned,
thereby leaving condemned property “completely undisturbed”).
34. See Victoria Sanchez, Why have so many DC-area golf courses closed since 2005?,
WJLA (June 17, 2019), https://wjla.com/sports/why-have-so-many-dc-area-golfcourses-closed-since-2005 (attributing expenses in upkeep and green fees for decision to end course’s lease).
35. See, e.g., Paul Maryniak, State high court ends Lakes legal battle, AHWATUKEE
F OOTHILLS N EWS (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.ahwatukee.com/news/article_4fdf5272-790b-11ea-99ca-a365849fc431.html [https://perma.cc/S6UT-L9UH]
(highlighting end of seven-year legal battle involving defunct Ahwatukee Lakes
Golf Course).
36. See generally F E D . R. C I V . P. 71.1 (providing rules governing
condemnation).
37. For further discussion of golf course case law, see infra notes 51-137 (discussing past use of inverse condemnations, takings, zoning, and land restrictions).
38. See Kelly Pedro, Builders Hit Hole-in-One: Dead Golf Courses Become Sites for
New Housing, REALTOR.COM (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.realtor.com/news/
trends/developers-hit-a-hole-in-one-as-golf-interest-dwindles/ [https://perma.cc/
V2AZ-XYNR] (equating “dead” golf courses with closed courses).
39. See, e.g., 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 103 (defining “condemnee” as “owner of a
property interest taken, injured or destroyed” through eminent domain).
40. See, e.g., City of Atlanta v. Mapel, 121 Ga. App. 567, 571 (1970) (finding
governmental immunity for tort liability on municipal golf course). But see Amaral
v. Cuppels, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 93 (2005) (finding private golf course owner
liable for trespass for stray balls).
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tion, such as through a town or city.41 Prerequisite to this
ownership model, a state’s legislature must first confer upon the
municipality the authority to undertake such responsibilities.42 Accordingly, ownership and operation is a legislative function upon
which the municipality’s citizens may hold sway by the political process.43 Municipal golf courses may overlap with the second type,
public golf courses, though public courses are distinguishable in
that private individuals may operate them for both public use and
commercial benefit.44 Thus, municipal golf courses can be considered a subset of public golf courses, though not all public golf
courses are necessarily municipally-owned.45
Further distinct from public golf courses is the third type examined in this Comment, private golf courses.46 These courses are
marked by private membership to country clubs, which is different
from privately owned courses that members of the general public
may enjoy upon payment of a fee.47 Because of their associations
with country clubs, private courses exist within a web of amenities
provided to their members, which may include clubhouses, dining
areas, pools, offices, bars, tennis courts, and other benefits.48 These
distinctions of ownership, while subtle, are important to keep in
mind to accurately gauge who comprises the ‘community’ surrounding the golf course – which thus frames the ethical questions
of whose interest should receive higher legal protection.49 Furthermore, the distinction between non-government-owned courses
41. See 18A MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 53:142 (3d ed.) (characterizing municipal golf courses as “proprietary” function rather than “governmental” function).
42. See West v. Town of Lake Placid, 97 Fla. 127, 143 (1929) (describing ownership and operation as “permissible municipal function”).
43. See Duran v. Cassidy, 28 Cal. App. 3d 574, 581-82 (1972) (holding city
council’s “declaration of public purpose” to build and operate golf course was “essentially legislative” and subject to voter approval, thus not merely administrative
decision in furtherance of legislative policy).
44. See, e.g., Golf Concepts v. City of Rochester Hills, 217 Mich. App. 21, 23,
26, 32 (1996) (finding private, for-profit corporation operating course on leased
city-owned property was “public park” but refusing property tax exemption).
45. See Gennrich v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 329 Wis. 2d 91, 104 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2010) (discussing employer’s duties for non-municipal public for-profit golf
course).
46. See State, Dep’t. of Revenue v. Teague, 441 So. 2d 914, 915 (Ala. 1983)
(noting distinction between privately owned public golf courses and purely private
golf courses).
47. See id. (upholding gross receipts tax on both courses).
48. See Algonquin Golf Club v. State Tax Comm’n, 220 S.W.3d 415, 417 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2007) (noting clubs’ solely social and recreational purposes and their notfor-profit, “break-even” revenue schemes).
49. For further discussion of how ‘community’ may differ depending on the
tool at issue, see infra notes 138-152 and accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021

7

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 6

456

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28: p. 449

from government-owned ones implies that government’s role will
vary in the appropriate amount of involvement in the golf course
afterlife.50
A. Par Three: A Trio of Land Use Tools
1. Takings
A “taking” refers to the Fifth Amendment’s allowance of the
government to seize private property “for public use” as long as the
government pays “just compensation” in return.51 For more typical
issues of government overregulating private property, United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence provides a standard path for determining whether a government taking occurs; first, if the government authorizes a “permanent physical occupation” against an
individual’s property rights, this is referred to as a Loretto taking.52
This is characterized as a ‘per se’ taking where government action
enables a physical invasion upon an owner’s property, for example
by allowing the fixation of utility wires on a parcel of private real
estate.53 This is a “very narrow” standard for a claimant to meet, as
courts interpret Loretto takings to require an element of permanence behind the occupation.54 Absent this permanent impact,
government may alternatively effectuate a Lucas taking if its regulation of property deprives the owner of all economically viable uses,
meaning the government renders the owner’s property essentially
valueless.55 An example of such would be government’s prohibition on private development because of the existence of wetlands
50. See James R. Todd, Trouble in Paradise: Redevelopment of Golf Courses in a
Changing Market, NAT’L L. REV. (May 27, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/trouble-paradise-redevelopment-golf-courses-changing-market [https://
perma.cc/K56D-YDEA] (stating challenge of redeveloping homeowner association
golf courses due to restrictive covenants).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”).
52. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421
(1982) (finding installation facilities on landlord’s property was taking requiring
just compensation).
53. See Wendie L. Kellington, New Takes on Old Takes: A Takings Law Update,
ALI-ABA 17 TH A NNUAL L AND U SE I NST ., http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/takings_update.htm [https://perma.cc/6S5V-32Y2] (last visited Dec. 18, 2020) (citing
GTE Northwest, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 321 Or. 458 (1995)) (finding Loretto
takings where government “allow[s] other companies to ‘collocate’ wires”).
54. F.C.C. v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 251-253 (1987) (quoting Loretto,
458 U.S. at 441) (finding no Loretto taking in Pole Attachments Act’s invitation to
lease utility pole spaces).
55. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019-20 (1992) (finding
total taking in government’s prohibition of owner building houses on beachfront
property).
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on the property.56 Lucas takings are often called ‘categorical’ regulatory takings, in which courts typically require the government regulation at issue to effectuate a “complete elimination” or “total loss”
of economic value.57
Since Loretto and Lucas takings tend to be quite rare, the more
common takings analysis stems from the Supreme Court case Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.58 Here, the inquiry of
whether a ‘regulatory taking’ has resulted from government regulation depends on an ad hoc balancing of several factors, i.e., the regulation’s economic impact on the property, the extent and
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and
the characterization of the government action at issue.59 For economic impact, a Penn Central taking likely requires more than diminution or change in market value, as courts would find retention of
significant value of the parcel weighs against the finding of a taking.60 The “investment-backed expectations” factor may require evidence that the property owner made expenditures or changed
56. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (noting trial court’s finding of Corps of Engineers’ denial of permit left
remaining property value “de minimus”).
57. Carol Necole Brown, The Categorical Lucas Rule and the Nuisance and Background Principles Exception, 30 TOURO L. REV. 349, 354 (2014) (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002))
(describing Lucas as “categorical rule turn[ing] on denial of all value or denial of
all use” (emphasis in original)).
58. 438 U.S. 104, 124, 138 (1978) (finding no taking for government’s development restrictions imposed upon landmark sites). According to a 2017 review of
takings claims, claimants asserting a Lucas taking enjoyed a success rate of only 1.6
percent. See Carol Necole Brown & Dwight H. Merriam, On the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Lucas: Making or Breaking the Takings Claim, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 184950 (2017) (finding only twenty-seven out of 1,700 state and federal cases in twentyfive years where Lucas taking claim prevailed).
59. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(noting Court’s inability to develop “set formula” instead of weighing factors).
These are commonly called the ‘Penn Central’ factors, to which another synthesizing factor courts may weigh is consideration of the “parcel as a whole.” Steven J.
Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 601,
612 (2014) (noting “parcel as a whole” factor’s importance in temporary takings
claims). At its time, the Penn Central decision was seen as a landmark decision for
architectural preservation and heritage. See Warren Weaver Jr., Ban on Grand Central Office Tower Is Upheld by Supreme Court 6 to 3, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 1978), https:/
/www.nytimes.com/1978/06/27/archives/new-jersey-pages-ban-on-grand-centraloffice-tower-is-upheld-by.html [https://perma.cc/3SB5-VJF9] (predicting decision
“to unleash a wave of new landmark designations by municipalities that have been
hesitant to try to preserve commercial properties because of possible legal
challenges”).
60. See Dunes West Golf Club, LLC v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 401 S.C. 280, 318
(2013) (finding “any change in market value of the Golf Course Property is merely
an incident of ownership that is not compensable under the Fifth Amendment”).
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development plans based on the government action.61 Lastly, when
a court looks at the characterization of the government action, it
understands that government regulation “involves the adjustment
of rights for the public good,” though there is no precise formula to
determine whether such “economic injuries caused by public action
[should] be compensated by the government rather than remain
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.”62 Still, because
members of the public both endure burdens and enjoy benefits
from governmental restriction, “[n]ot all damages suffered by a private property owner at the hands of [a] governmental agency are
compensable.”63 Altogether, a takings inquiry, whether through
Loretto, Lucas, or Penn Central, determines whether a regulatory action is “functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from
his domain,” which accordingly is a question of the severity of government’s burden upon its citizens’ property rights.64
A golf course owner would likely challenge a government taking through an ‘inverse condemnation’ claim to recover the value
of the property seized.65 The landowner must initiate this claim in
response to an alleged taking, hence the ‘inverse’ to condemnation
proceedings where government initiates the action to acquire the
property through eminent domain.66 In either claim – legitimizing
or challenging a condemnation proceeding – the party against the
government must have a valid, enforceable property interest as a
prerequisite basis for compensation.67 In the case of golf courses,
that real property interest terminates when the lease expires with61. See id. at 320 (noting no evidence of developer’s expenditures following
town’s zoning decision).
62. Id. at 315-16 (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538
(2005)) (considering this determination question of “justice and fairness”).
63. Id. at 316 (quoting Carolina Chloride, Inc. v. Richland Cty., 394 S.C. 154,
170 (2011)) (framing burdens as expense of “living and doing business in a civilized community” (quoting Kirby Forest Indust. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14
(1984))).
64. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539-40 (observing Penn Central’s large focus is “magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with
legitimate property interests”).
65. See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pa., 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2168 (2019) (noting direct
contrast to condemnation claim where government initiates action to acquire, and
noting claims arise in state court pursuant to state statute).
66. See San Diego Metro. Transit Dev. Bd. v. Handlery Hotel, Inc., 73 Cal.
App. 4th 517, 529 (1999) (citing direct authorization of both proceedings by California Constitution).
67. See id. at 529, 532 (requiring “vested, legally enforceable property interest
. . . for compensation in an inverse condemnation proceeding for loss of future
business”).
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out renewal.68 In instances where a golf course exists under an existing lease but the course sits idly, closed, or abandoned, then a
takings proceeding appears most appropriate.69 Provided the
owner of the dead course is unable to find another private owner to
repurpose the land, this scenario may allow the government’s
proactivity in recognizing and fulfilling the better future use of the
property.70
As a form of government takings, the United States legal system has long recognized eminent domain as the common law right
of government to take private property for its own public uses.71
The justification for this power expanded significantly sixteen years
ago in Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut, where the Supreme
Court affirmed broad qualifications for “public use” and found economic development a sufficient public purpose for the taking of
property.72 Kelo employed this expanded rule to validate a nonprofit development agency’s condemnation of private real estate in
an urban neighborhood, which was purported for redevelopment
to implement the agency’s urban revitalization plan that the city
adopted.73 With condemnation of property as a weapon and a
68. See id. at 533 (“Here, the real property interest is inextricably intertwined
with the business of operating the golf course. Without the former, the latter does
not exist.”).
69. Cf. Josh Sens, 7 surprising things that happen when course maintenance stops,
GOLF (Apr. 10, 2020), https://golf.com/news/7-surprising-things-when-golfcourses-stop-maintenance/ [https://perma.cc/33FU-TS63] (providing basic steps
of golf course maintenance like mowing, weeding, watering, and cleaning
contamination).
70. See, e.g., Amy Biolchini, Highlands Golf Club sold to Blandford Nature Center,
MLIVE GRAND RAPIDS (Jan. 19, 2019), https://www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/
2017/02/highlands_golf_club_sold_to_bl.html [https://perma.cc/FAW2-U456]
(reporting owner’s transfer of golf course to nonprofit land conservancy).
71. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 373-74, 376 (1875) (describing right
as belonging to United States with no requirement of consent from states).
72. See Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 472, 480, 484 (2005)
(upholding taking of private property as part of city’s economic development
plan).
73. See id. at 472-75 (stating revitalization plan designed to create jobs, increase tax revenue, and help “build momentum for revitalization of downtown
New London”). The Kelo decision generated intense backlash, with polls showing
over eighty percent of the public disapproving. See Ilya Somin, Opinion: The political and judicial reaction to Kelo, W ASH . P OST (June 4, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/04/the-politicaland-judicial-reaction-to-kelo/ [https://perma.cc/RQJ7-5QMH] (stating “opposition cut across conventional partisan, ideological, racial, and gender division . . .
on which Rush Limbaugh, Ralph Nader, libertarians, and the NAACP were all on
the same side”). Kelo is also described as one of the worst Supreme Court decisions. See Damon Root, John Paul Stevens Is Still Trying To Defend the Kelo Debacle,
REASON (May 16, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/05/16/john-paul-stevens-is-stilltrying-to-defend-the-kelo-debacle/ (arguing “destructive ruling paved the way for
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broad reading of ‘public uses’ as ammunition, local governments
could thereafter use eminent domain with ease to transform the
use of golf course land.74 However, note the distinction between
eminent domain as a means to convert golf courses into other uses,
versus a means to turn land into golf courses; this Comment focuses
on the former.75 Still, repurposing land to create a golf course
could satisfy the courts’ broad definition of public purpose anyway,
as golf courses fit within permissible parks and recreation uses.76
In determining whether government’s use of eminent domain
effectively benefits the community, an appropriate consideration is
the government’s underlying agenda or intent in acquiring the golf
course property.77 This focus on government intention relates back
to the “public use” requirement for takings, which courts may define literally as public employment of the property right, or more
broadly or comprehensively as any “[p]ublic advantage, convenience, or benefit . . . contribut[ing] to the general welfare and the
prosperity of the whole community . . . .”78 Parks and recreational
purposes serve a public use quite explicitly.79 Road expansion may
also suffice.80 However, when government takes property for nonatrocious real world consequences . . . [and] mangled the Takings Clause); see also
Casey C. Sullivan, 13 Worst Supreme Court Decisions of All Time, FINDLAW (Oct. 14,
2015), https://blogs.findlaw.com/supreme_court/2015/10/13-worst-supremecourt-decisions-of-all-time.html [https://perma.cc/T8DF-NM6J] (listing Kelo and
Lucas decisions).
74. But see Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to
Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2119 (2009) (noting quick and often ineffective state
responses to limit Kelo’s power).
75. See, e.g., In re Condemnation of Certain Properties and Property Interests
for Use as Public Golf Course, 822 A.2d 846, 856 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (finding
use as golf course sufficient public use for condemnees’ property).
76. See Dornan v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 331 Pa. 209, 221-22 (1938) (“The taking
of land for a public golf course or playground would be for a public use . . . [and
it] is not essential that the entire community or even any considerable portion of it
should directly enjoy or participate . . . in order to make its use a public one.”); see
also Hanna v. Sunrise Recreation, Inc., 94 So. 2d 597, 601 (Fla. 1957) (describing
park purposes).
77. See, e.g., City of Austin v. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766, 781-82 (Tex. 2012)
(holding no bad faith in government’s taking for parking garage).
78. State Highway Comm’n v. Thornton, 271 N.C. 227, 242 (1967) (finding
construction of public road as sufficient public use).
79. See, e.g., Matter of Cty. of Suffolk, 333 N.Y.S.2d 686, 688 (1972) (allowing
county to use parks and recreation purposes to condemn private venture that included golf course); see also William Bros. Lumber Co. v. Gwinnett Cnty., 258 Ga.
243, 243 (1988) (citing state statutory authority that qualifies parks and recreation
as public purposes for county’s condemnation proceedings).
80. See, e.g., Div. of Admin., State of Fla. Dept. of Transp. v. Frenchman, Inc.,
476 So. 2d 224, 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (determining severance damages for
taking golf course property to widen state highway).
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public uses, additional justifications or conditions may be required,
like the pursuit of an urban development plan as in Kelo.81
One observation about takings litigation is that private landowners tend to rely on theories from the other property law principles discussed herein to demonstrate whether a compensable
taking has occurred.82 Particularly often, these challengers allege
that government zoning decisions overregulate their private property to the extent of a de facto taking, triggering the Penn Central
analysis.83 An example of this interplay between regulatory takings
and zoning appears in Ocean Palm Golf Club Partnership v. City of
Flagler Beach, where a Florida appellate court found the city’s refusal
to change its comprehensive plan did not amount to a taking under
the conventional framework.84 Plaintiff Ocean Palm Golf petitioned for its closed golf course to be rezoned from a recreational
zone to a low-density zone so the owners could then develop the
parcel.85 While the court recognized that a government’s inaction
in response may constitute a taking under certain circumstances,
Ocean Palm Golf’s situation was distinguishable as an attempt to
force the city to “act as a guarantor for the landowner’s investment
after it becomes unprofitable due to, not the zoning regulations,
but outside market forces.“86 Because plaintiff’s parcels as a whole
retained economic beneficial use, the court found no regulatory
81. See, e.g., McCord v. Hous. Auth. of City of Atlanta, 246 Ga. 547, 551 (1980)
(finding Georgia law allowed takings for non-public use if private landowner’s remedy was option to retain land and develop it in accordance with urban redevelopment plan).
82. See, e.g., Forest View Co. v. Town of Monument, 646 P.3d 774, 779-80
(Colo. 2020) (refusing to compensate private claimants under eminent domain or
regulatory taking theories where government violated restrictive covenant); see also
Witzel v. Vill. of Brainard, 208 Neb. 231, 232-34 (1981) (allowing village’s eminent
domain proceeding despite plaintiffs’ claim that public use behind taking violated
zoning ordinance).
83. See Ocean Palm Golf Club P’ship v. City of Flagler Beach, 139 So. 3d 463,
471 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (attributing claims to “inverse condemnation” causes
of action, where taking occurred without formal exercise of eminent domain
power).
84. See id. at 472, 474 (finding sustained economic use of property, thereby
finding no takings under Lucas and Penn Central inquiries).
85. See id. at 470-71 (noting trial court’s holding that property could still be
used as golf course).
86. Id. at 472-73 (noting longstanding character of land in this case further
distinguishes it from cases where government refusal to rezone constituted taking). In refusing to award compensation to Ocean Palm Golf, the court noted
“[it] is not the purpose of eminent domain law” for government to bear the cost of
the landowner’s “failed economic expectations.” Id. at 473 (attributing loss of
profits to over-construction of courses, aging population of players, and increased
operating costs).
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taking under the Penn Central factors, despite the zoning bearing a
disproportionate impact on plaintiff.87
A second observation with takings litigation is that the extent
of relief awarded to a successful plaintiff will depend on the magnitude of the taking, meaning whether the condemnation of the golf
course is an all-or-nothing operation or is a partial taking may affect
the compensation.88 Typically, partial takings are legal, where government may seize only a portion of an entire parcel of land to
fulfill its project, such as taking a strip of private farmland to build a
road.89 In a golf course partial taking example, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the payment of compensation to a landowner who suffered loss of four acres from his forty-four-acre golf
course to the federal government in expansion of a U.S. highway
bypass.90 A different Idaho case dealt with condemnation by the
state against a city to take fourteen acres of a larger 255-acre tract
that the city planned to use for adding holes to an existing golf
course.91
However, with partial takings, conflict arises primarily in the
proper assessment of damages, specifically whether government
must pay additional severance damages when the remainder of the
non-taken land suffers a diminution of value.92 Severance damages
87. See id. at 473-74 (attributing disproportionate impact to second Penn Central factor of considering character of government action in favor of golf club
plaintiff, but finding impact outweighed by plaintiff’s sustainable investmentbacked expectations and economic value). The decision was appealed to the Florida Supreme Court, but ultimately denied review. See Ocean Palm Golf Club Partnership v. City of Flagler Beach, 160 So. 3d 897, 897 (Fla. 2015) (declining to
accept jurisdiction under Florida Constitution); see also Patricia Salkin, FL Appeals
Court Holds City’s Refusal to Change its Comprehensive Plan was not a Taking, LAW OF
THE LAND BLOG (Aug. 2014), https://lawoftheland.wordpress.com/2014/08/21/
fl-appeals-court-holds-citys-refusal-to-change-its-comprehensive-plan-was-not-a-taking/ [https://perma.cc/E5UN-UNGE] (summarizing case and reporting appeal
to Florida Supreme Court).
88. See, e.g., Ocean Palm Golf Club P’ship v. City of Flagler Beach, 139 So. 3d
at 473 (considering whether partial taking of golf course occurred).
89. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Partial Takings, 117 COLUM. L.
REV. 2043, 2045, 2049 (2017) (claiming partial takings more common than total
takings in some jurisdictions).
90. See State v. Meadowbrook, Inc., 286 Ala. 359, 360 (1970) (considering admissibility of evidence and abuse of discretion in awarding damage amount).
91. See State ex rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528, 530
(1972) (noting state’s purpose for eminent domain for proposed highway
construction).
92. See id. at 532 (providing Idaho statute on severance damages and affirming jury’s proper award of such damages); see also United States v. 9.20 Acres of
Land, More or Less, Situate in Polk Cty., State of Iowa, 638 F.2d 1123, 1127 (8th
Cir. 1981) (calculating just compensation separately based off fair and reasonable
market value immediately before and immediately after taking).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol28/iss2/6

14

Schmidt: Beyond the Green: The Legal Land Use Controls Involved with Golf

2021]

BEYOND THE GREEN

463

awards depend on whether the taken acreage was part of a larger
parcel of land as opposed to two separate parcels, and the question
is practical for a jury to decide.93 Accordingly, the extent to which a
government taking affects the value of the remaining land, i.e., if
government takes a substantially valuable asset from the remainder
of a golf course, the loss of the value relative to the remaining use
of the land is a worthy consideration.94 Hence, how plaintiffs may
frame their takings claims against government will involve strategic
decisions on how to describe the parcel at issue and its relationship
to the remaining or surrounding land.95
Lastly, the role of timeliness (or lack thereof) in takings proceedings is certainly worth observing.96 Government can dismiss its
condemnation suit at any time prior to the actual acquisition of
property.97 The actual acquisition gives government the legal
rights to use the property, but not until the seized owner receives
payment.98 In the time between filing and acquisition, ordinary delays are excusable, absent bad faith or deliberate obstruction of the
proceedings.99 However, substantial delay may relieve the impacted
landowner by imposing liability upon government for substantial
rise in value.100 Therefore, litigants should be mindful of the extent of delay imposed by the government and whether they can establish prejudice as a result of the delay.101 This consideration
93. See 9.20 Acres of Land, 638 F.2d at 1127 (noting considerations of whether
two pieces of land are effectively single parcel include “the use and appearance of
the land, its legal divisions, and the intent of its owner”).
94. See United States v. 51.8 Acres of Land, More or Less, Town of Hampstead, Nassau Cty., New York, 147 F. Supp. 356, 360-61 (E.D.N.Y. 1956) (awarding
severance damages to golf course owner when government condemned three
holes – “valuable asset”).
95. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 89, at 2062 (noting unique economic
issues in partial takings claims).
96. See, e.g., Abbas v. United States, 124 Fed. Cl. 46, 53 (2015) (barring takings
claim for failing to meet six-year statute of limitations required by United States
Court of Federal Claims).
97. See Forest Preserve Dist. of DuPage Cty. v. First Nat’l Bank of Franklin
Park, 930 N.E.2d 477, 498 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that date
of taking is date of condemnation filing).
98. See id. (valuing just compensation at date of taking).
99. See id. at 504 (providing general safeguard from liability under Illinois law
for ordinary delay, but not for intentional or willful conduct “calculated to obstruct
or hinder the court’s administration of justice,” among other grounds for
sanctions).
100. See id. at 499 (citing Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1,
18-19 (1984)) (finding eight years substantial delay in taking property that included golf course acreage).
101. See Pennichuck Corp. v. City of Nashua, 152 N.H. 729, 740-41 (2005)
(requiring alleged prejudice “more than mere hypothetical and unlikely financial
harm” and finding lack of evidence that city’s delay in filing condemnation peti-
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likely goes towards a separate inquiry whether the government acted in good or bad faith in regards to a legitimate interest, though
that bad faith inquiry may ultimately loop back to the third Penn
Central factor concerning the characterization of the government
action.102
2. Zoning
After takings, the next most important consideration in addressing dead golf courses is the zoning schemes in which the
courses rest.103 In essence, zoning is the practice of dividing land
into districts dedicated to separate uses, like single-family residential, commercial, industrial, and so forth.104 Zoning ordinances are
frequently intended to conform to a comprehensive zoning plan,
and such ordinances are constitutional so long as they substantially
relate to “the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”105
Contrarily, zoning determinations that do not benefit the public in
effect may be struck down as an arbitrary or irrational exercise of
the government’s police power.106
Zoning classifications and designs may vary based on how states
divide their local governments, but the designations follow similar
structures across the country.107 In a New Hampshire town example, golf courses are listed under commercial recreational facilities,
which are allowed in designated commercial/industrial districts.108
tion prejudiced utility company). But see Captline v. Cty. of Allegheny, 693 A.2d
619, 621 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (finding landowner’s ten-year delay and lack of
due diligence in pursuing de facto taking claim prejudiced government, citing rebuttable presumption of two-year delay as prejudicial).
102. See John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 171, 198 (2005) (citing Tahoe-Sierra for additional consideration of
whether government action taken in bad faith).
103. For further discussion of the importance and relevance of zoning, see
infra notes 104-120, 184-198, 247-277 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 380
(1926) (describing zoning ordinance that classifies land into use, height, and area
districts).
105. Id. at 395 (holding constitutionality of comprehensive zoning plans, or
‘Euclidean’ zoning).
106. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-89 (1928) (finding due process violation in ordinance that injured individual plaintiff and was not
indispensable to general plan).
107. See 12 C.F.R. § 390.304 (including subdivisions and departments created
and expressly authorized by state statutes, excluding inner subordinate or nonautonomous divisions, agencies, or boards).
108. See TOWN OF ENFIELD, ZONING AND FLOODPLAIN DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE
at 19, 76 (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.enfield.nh.us/sites/g/files/vyhlif3106/f/
uploads/current_zoning_ordinance_2020-_updated_march_10_2020_final_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8Q6H-WM78] (“In the C/I District, land may be used and
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Golf courses may also fall within recreational facilities, and the
town’s Zoning Board of Adjustment may grant an exception to the
zoned use and allow operation within residential and community
business districts.109 In another example, but from a county-wide
ordinance in Colorado, golf courses are listed under parks and
open space, and allowed in rural, urban residential, some nonresidential, and some mixed use districts.110 A Michigan township’s
zoning ordinance lists golf courses as outdoor recreation requiring
a special land use permit, with additional regulations on golf
courses in particular.111 Similarly, an Alabama city ordinance permits golf courses in agricultural districts, permits special exceptions
in residential districts, and classifies golf courses as outdoor recreation facilities but not as open space.112
When a local private plaintiff challenges a zoning or planning
decision, these claims may inherently involve the same legal theories as takings analyses.113 For example, in Dunes West Golf Club,
LLC v. Town of Mount Pleasant, the challenger alleged the city’s decision to rezone golf course property for conservation and recreation
purposes instead of allowing residential development constituted a
taking under both Lucas and Penn Central.114 The South Carolina
buildings may be erected or altered for the following purposes only and subject to
the following regulations and limitations . . . C. Commercial recreational uses.”).
109. See id. at 30-32, 82 (permitting special exceptions for non-commercial
golf courses in residential, rural residential, and rural residential-agricultural districts and permitting special exceptions for commercial and non-commercial golf
courses in community business districts).
110. See MESA COUNTY, 2020 LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE §§ 6-2, 12-19 (Sept. 29,
2020), https://www.mesacounty.us/globalassets/planning/codes-plans-policies—
standards/land-development-code/full-code/mesa-county-2020-land-developmentcode—-amended-september-29-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KV6-DJES] (including table for permitted and conditional uses).
111. See GRAND HAVEN CHARTER TOWNSHIP, ZONING ORDINANCE 2020 §§ 12.0405, 12.38 (Mar. 22, 2020), http://www.ght.org/wp-content/uploads/delightfuldownloads/2020/04/GHT-Zoning-Ordinance_04202020-compressed.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/D2X7-8PDK] (imposing lot size, fence height, property line distance
requirements on golf courses).
112. See CITY OF MADISON, ALABAMA, ZONING ORDINANCE §§ 4-0-2, 4-11-1, 4-126, 5-22-2 (July 22, 2020), https://www.madisonal.gov/DocumentCenter/View/
11365/Zoning-Ordinance-July-2020?bidId= [https://perma.cc/DLX6-BWLS] (excluding golf courses from open space specifically for Traditional Neighborhood
Development Districts).
113. For further discussion on golf course takings cases arising from zoning
disputes, see supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
114. See Dunes West Golf Club, LLC v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 401 S.C. 280,
313-14 (2013) (alleging rezoning was per se taking because it “eliminated all economically beneficial use of the claimed developable land” and rezoning was regulatory taking “functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government
directly appropriated private property or ousts the owner from his domain”).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021

17

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 6

466

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28: p. 449

Supreme Court disagreed, noting the golf course “remains a valuable property, not only as a golf course, but also for other, related
uses permitted by the [ordinance].”115 Similarly in Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, but in the context of a larger planning
scheme, the Minnesota Supreme Court found the city’s refusal to
amend its comprehensive plan – thereby disallowing residential development on a golf course – passed rational basis review as the
court upheld the city’s concerns in preservation of recreational
space and historical land use.116 The property owner further alleged the denial to amend the plan was a regulatory taking despite
passing rational basis review, though the court refused an ultimate
determination on the question due to factual disputes.117
Thus, an emerging pattern appears that government will prevail in both takings and zoning disputes where it may advance justifiable public purposes for eminent domain use or legitimate
reasons for its zoning decisions.118 Government enjoys a healthy
amount of deference towards zoning decisions because these practices are manifestations of the government’s police power and because they are legislative matters, which are presumptively valid.119
Provided the government does not infringe upon its constituents’
constitutional rights, perhaps by discriminating against race or class
through zoning, then its zoning classification decisions will likely
stand against scrutiny.120
115. Id. at 321 (finding government’s adjustment of “benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good” legitimate). Before the decision
reached the South Carolina Supreme Court, speculation arose that the Dunes West
Golf Club decision would be the first of many lawsuits concerning failing golf
courses in the state. See Prentiss Findlay, Dunes West fighting to build 32 homes, POST
& COURIER (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.postandcourier.com/news/dunes-westfighting-to-build-32-homes/article_ad84539b-61bc-57a2-9b4a-110665926537.html
[https://perma.cc/6FUK-BT94] (interviewing South Carolina Golf Course Owners Association president, predicting “[i]t was just a matter of time before someone
challenged [the new municipal zoning]” and acknowledging urgency in state supreme court hearing case).
116. See Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 627, 631
(Minn. 2007) (giving great deference to city’s judgment).
117. See id. at 631, 642 (balancing Penn Central factors). The following year in
a referendum, Eagan residents voted against the city purchasing the land. See
Vadim Lavrusik, Carriage Hills Golf Course timeline, STARTRIBUNE (Feb. 17, 2009),
https://www.startribune.com/carriage-hills-golf-course-timeline/39577002/
[https://perma.cc/6PNZ-JYQF] (reporting 53-47 vote with 35,560 votes cast).
118. For further discussion of courts authorizing government takings power,
see supra notes 51-102 and accompanying text.
119. See Harbit v. City of Charleston, 382 S.C. 383, 390 (2009) (noting property owner’s burden to overcome presumptive validity of zoning decisions).
120. See id. at 391 (noting courts’ caution to find zoning ordinances unconstitutional “as it is not the court’s function to pass upon the wisdom or expediency of
municipal ordinances or regulations”).
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3. Covenants
Covenants, restrictions, and conditions, hereinafter referred to
broadly as ‘covenants,’ are the third type of relevant land use control, and these formulate as contractual rights or obligations imposed upon owners of real property.121 These rights and
restrictions “run with the land,” meaning future possessors of the
property are bound by the terms of the declaration.122 However,
for the covenant to run with the land, it must be the intention of
the original grantor, declarant, or parties for the covenant to do so
for the burden or benefit of the successors in interest.123 Depending on state law, courts may find other characteristics essential to
the enforceability of the covenant, too.124 Examples of such characteristics might include the covenant’s relationship to the use or enjoyment of the land (“touch and concern” the land) or that a
successional relationship exists between affected parties (‘privity’).125 This legal tool varies in nature from zoning and takings
because covenants exist as agreements between private parties,
whose legal dispute may call upon government actors to decide
whether such agreements should ultimately be enforced under
state law.126
Golf course litigation arising out of state courts often debates
the existence and enforceability of an implied restrictive covenant,
121. See Hawk v. PC Vill. Ass’n, Inc., 233 Ariz. 94, 98 (2013) (considering covenants contracts under Arizona statute, confirmed through deed language).
122. See Cloud v. Ass’n of Owners, Satellite Apartment Bldg., Inc., 857 P.2d
435, 440 (Colo. App. 1992) (noting real property covenants “burden or benefit
successors in interest”).
123. See id. (providing text of declaration stating “[t]he following . . . covenants . . . shall be deemed to run with the land, shall be a benefit and a burden to
Declarant, its successors and assigns . . . .”).
124. See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 746 F.3d 1008,
1030-33 (11th Cir. 2014) (comparing interpretations of covenant state law in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Florida).
125. See Cloud, 857 P.2d at 440 (requiring covenant to “closely relate to the
land, its use, or its enjoyment” to fulfill “touch and concern” requirement); see also
Misita v. Conn, 138 So. 3d 138, 142 n.6 (Miss. 2014) (quoting Clement v. R.L.
Burns Corp., 373 So. 2d 790, 794 (Miss. 1979)) (finding privity in someone who
“stands in the shoes or sits in the seat of the owner from whom he derives his title”
and enhancement of value, conferred benefit, or imposed burden on land sufficient to “touch and concern” land).
126. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (finding racially restrictive covenant violation of Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause).
While covenants more typically involve issues in state law granting their enforceability, Shelley was notable in that the Supreme Court struck the covenant down as
an improper extension of the state’s use of its police power that violated federal
protections. See id. at 21-22 (“[I]t would appear beyond question that the power of
the State to create and enforce property interests must be exercised within the
boundaries defined by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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which “raises and fastens upon” title of a lot and prevents use of
that lot “in a manner detrimental to the enjoyment and value of
neighboring lots sold with express restrictions in their conveyance.”127 Restrictive covenants prohibit certain uses or acts,
whereas affirmative covenants require certain uses or acts.128 Further, express restrictions in covenants are bound to state law principles of contract interpretation.129 Whether the restrictive covenant
is implied, however, requires courts to look into the intent of the
common grantor in effectuating the restriction as part of a common plan.130 Accordingly, enforcement of the restriction involves a
weighing of equity and consideration of whether the land purchaser had knowledge of the restriction.131 A finding of an implied
restriction as such may contravene express written restrictions
found in property deeds, so courts may hesitate in definitively finding and enforcing such implied covenants.132
The above state law interpretation of an implied restrictive covenant comes from a Nebraska Supreme Court case, where the court
found an implied restrictive covenant required the property at issue
to be maintained as a golf course because of surrounding homeowners’ reliance on such maintenance.133 Similarly, in a different
case from Arizona, the court found enough evidence of notice and
intent for an implied covenant requiring continued use of property
as a golf course, notwithstanding the lack of the same burden on
127. Skyline Woods Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Broekemeier, 276 Neb. 792,
805 (2008) (reviewing whether defendants “had constructive notice of such
covenant”).
128. See In re Midsouth Golf, LLC, 549 B.R. 156, 164-65 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
2016) (differentiating personal covenants from covenants running with land).
129. See Hollingsworth v. Chateau Bu-De, LLC, 987 F. Supp. 2d 629, 635 (D.
Md. 2013) (noting problem of ambiguities in express covenants).
130. See Skyline Woods Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 276 Neb. at 805 (determining
grantor’s intent not only through deed language, but also through “related written
documents, including conduct, conversation, and correspondence”).
131. See id. (requiring actual or constructive knowledge).
132. See id. at 806 (“[B]ecause implied restrictive covenants mandate relaxation of the writing requirement, courts are generally reluctant and cautious to conclude implied restrictive covenants exist.”).
133. See id. at 810 (concluding “homeowners who bought their property relying on the proximity and existence of the golf course should be protected”). As
practical recommendations following the Skyline Woods case stated, “[a]ttorneys
should always draft their covenants, restrictions, and easements explicitly . . . .”
Daniel J. Hassing, FORE! A Heads-Up to Nebraska Real Estate Attorneys After the Skyline
Woods Golf Course Case, 1 NEB. L. REV. BULL. 37, 43 (2009), http://
lawreview.unl.edu/?p=582 [https://perma.cc/3NCV-X685] (emphasis in original)
(warning of litigation costs now that Nebraska courts may find restriction by
implication).
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other neighbors.134 In a more recent Eleventh Circuit case that aligned itself with the Arizona case, the court affirmed the Alabama
Supreme Court’s decision that an implied restrictive covenant existed demanding a golf course property to be used as such in what
the court called “an abstract question of law.”135 Here, the Eleventh Circuit gave weight to different methods from state case law
that may indicate whether the original grantor intended a common
scheme of development, plus neighboring homeowners’ expectation that the golf course property in question would indeed remain
a golf course.136 These cases demonstrate that a covenant’s overall
effect on a dead course will depend on a considerations of the land
grantor’s intention, surrounding property owners’ own expectations and conditions, and equity for the covenant’s challenger –
altogether in an imperfect, unclear calculus.137
B. Fairway Factors: The Role of Community and Ethics
The legality of these land use controls does not automatically
qualify such practices as ‘moral’ or ‘ethical.’138 In areas of law and
morality where no public consensus exists, private interests may
134. See Shalimar Ass’n v. D.O.C. Enterprises, Ltd., 142 Ariz. 36, 43, 46 (1984)
(upholding restriction imposed by original developer until year 2025). Later disputes have arisen between the homeowners association and the country club itself
over legal title to land along the perimeter of the golf course, which could be
subject to future development. See About Us, Shalimar Association, https://
shalimarassociation.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/9KWR-8MK7] (last visited
Mar. 5, 2021) (identifying homeowners association as legal owner of disputed strip
parcel).
135. In re Heatherwood Holdings, LLC, 746 F.3d 1206, 1214 (11th Cir. 2014)
(noting sufficiently similar facts to Shalimar and questioning economic feasibility,
estoppel, and notice as related to covenant’s existence).
136. See id. at 1215, 1218 (considering written restrictions in deeds, plats
showing restrictions, actual conditions, and acceptance of conditions by lot owners). Three years after the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, the Heatherwood Hills
Country Club reopened the golf course to the public. See Rick Karle, Heatherwood
Hills Country Club reopens after 8 years, WBRC (Aug. 12, 2017), https://
www.wbrc.com/story/35688632/heatherwood-hills-country-club-reopens-after-8years/ (reporting “resurrection” of golf club against odds of other failing courses);
see also Guy Cipriano, The hills are alive again, GOLF COURSE INDUS. MAG. (May 8,
2018), https://www.golfcourseindustry.com/article/heatherwood-hills-golf-alabama/ [https://perma.cc/63KT-YLMZ] (detailing bankruptcy and ensuing reopening process).
137. See In re Erie Golf Course, 605 Pa. 484, 492-493 (2010) (applying public
trust doctrine to golf course sale).
138. See L. Scott Smith, Law, Morality, and Judicial Decision-Making, 65 TEX. B.J.
400, 403 (2002) (questioning how law “ought” to be, regarding moral
imperatives).
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prevail over the public good.139 To determine which legal tool fits
best for different scenarios of dead courses, this Comment gives
consideration to two basic theories of ethics, utilitarianism and deontology, to guide responsible public policy.140
Because these ethical theories will be applied to assess the benefits to the community, a conscious understanding of the idea of
‘community’ is a preliminary matter.141 According to one definition, community refers entirely to “a feeling and a set of relationships among people,” whose members share history, trust, safety,
belonging, and care for each other in an individual or collective
context.142 Since community is dependent upon people’s outputs
for each other, locations such as golf clubs and organizations are
not communities themselves; rather, they serve as venues for communities to form and meet members’ needs.143
However, community cannot be reduced merely to a relationship oriented towards fulfilling common needs.144 One study identified common “core elements” of communities according to
philosophy, psychology, and sociology, including themes of “physical proximity, shared, group, bounded, interaction, belonging, and
support.”145 Other considerations of a community may include its
sustenance, its symbol, freedom of territory, process of actions, diversity, and tangibility, though these may be less applicable to communities at issue around dead golf courses.146 Accordingly, this
Comment uses ‘community’ to refer to people with common inter139. See id. at 408 (noting individual judge’s conception of morality inevitably
guides resolution, and “moral theory can be ignored only at the peril of the law
and those who administer it”).
140. For further discussion of utilitarianism and deontological ethics, see infra notes 153-160 and accompanying text.
141. See David M. Chavis & Kien Lee, What Is Community Anyway?, STAN. SOCIAL I NNOVATION R EV . (May 12, 2015), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/
what_is_community_anyway [https://perma.cc/9DB2-2N7X] (noting term’s
meaning “requires more thoughtfulness and deliberation” by policymakers).
142. See id. (stating purpose of communities to meet “common needs”).
143. See id. (observing great variance in formation and organization of communities – i.e., through shared culture or experiences, through formal or informal
institutions).
144. See Virginie Cobigo, Lynn Martin & Rawad Mcheimech, Understanding
Community, 5 CANADIAN J. DISABILITY STUDIES 181, 188 (Dec. 2016), retrieved from
https://cjds.uwaterloo.ca/index.php/cjds/article/view/318/540 [https://
perma.cc/Q752-N6JJ] (surveying sixty-six definitions of “community” for common
themes).
145. See id. at 190, 192 (suggesting derivative definition for community as
“group of people that interact and support each other, and are bounded by shared
experiences or characteristics, a sense of belonging, and often by their physical
proximity”).
146. See id. at 188-89 (defining or giving examples of such themes).
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ests or goals concerning dead courses, with additional emphasis on
physical and geographical proximity to the golf course parcel at issue – and as follows, golf courses may involve multiple communities
whose visions conflict with each other.147
The definition of ‘community’ becomes more skewed when it
is attached to ‘development’ – the idea of which inherently invites
competing interests over land use.148 Actual community development action may flow from those with exclusive ownership of the
property at issue; however, a potentially separate ‘sense of ownership’ may exist within a different community that might influence
public involvement and support in the development.149 Sense of
ownership manifests in perceived control of the process, the outcome, and the distribution, which entails questions of whose voices
are heard, who has influence over decisions, and who will be impacted in the end.150 When interests clash, the result is a decline in
trust from community members towards the developer or decisionmaker.151 Though not a determinative factor in this Comment’s analysis, decisionmakers should not undermine trust, as it
may reconcile parties’ disparities and ultimately guide effective
public policy.152
After defining the invested communities, the next step is to
figure how to advance their interests righteously and effectively, for
which basic considerations of ethics can help.153 Here, ethics refers
to the traditional philosophical understanding, and not the idea of
147. See id. at 190 (depicting how definitions of community may vary by discipline of respondent).
148. See Paul Lachapelle, A Sense of Ownership in Community Development: Understanding the Potential for Participation in Community Planning Efforts, 39 J. CMTY. DEV.
SOC’Y 52, 53 (2008), retrieved from http://www.msucommunitydevelopment.org/
paul/content/Lachapelle%202008%20Ownership%20JCDS.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VE8E-Y9LS] (identifying sense of ownership in process, outcome, and
distribution as essential in community ownership).
149. See id. at 53 (implying political undertones to sense of ownership).
150. See id. at 53-55 (considering how sense of ownership develops through
temporal and spatial community activities).
151. See id. at 56 (noting role of risk and authority in quality of trust).
152. See Christopher A. Cooper, H. Gibbs Knotts, & Kathleen M. Brennan,
The Importance of Trust in Government for Public Administration: The Case of Zoning, 68
PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 459, 464 (2008), retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/
25145624 [https://perma.cc/5ZJG-C7RE] (finding trust in government important
as it “has the potential to relieve the tensions between political accountability and
managerial flexibility“).
153. See Thomas R. Bender, Irons v. Ethics Commission: Missing Pieces, 58 R.I.
BAR J. 7, 7 (June 2010) (asserting “laws are enacted because they serve and benefit
the public’s interests, not the private interests of individual legislators to the detriment of the public interest”).
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‘legal ethics.’154 The ethical theory that appears most uniformly applicable to disputes in dead golf course usage would be utilitarianism, which mandates the result that brings “the greatest amount of
good for the greatest number.”155 In other words, a decision on
land use may be “objectively right” if it “will produce the greatest
amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into account all
whose happiness is affected by the conduct.”156 Utilitarian ethics
could help guide government officials in deciding which zone classification will bring the best objective benefit to the community, or
in deciding whether an alternative use of the golf course is necessary for the general public that would justify the use of eminent
domain.157 A second theory of ethics that could guide golf course
decisions going forward is deontology, which asserts that certain
moral duties guide the actions and choices of individuals.158 This
duty would mandate respect and dignity towards humanity as a
whole.159 Thus, while utilitarianism might help guide broader pol154. See generally Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N (2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/
model_rules_of_professional_conduct/
model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents/ [https://perma.cc/
74X4-BGLG] (providing what jurisprudence typically calls ‘legal ethics’). Still, legal ethics may also provide relevant backdrops to bear in mind – for example,
zoning board members should not decide land use disputes as motivated by their
own personal profit. See Patricia E. Salkin, 1998 Survey of Ethics in Land-Use Planning, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1393, 1394 (May 1999) (applying rules against conflicts
of interest). Moreover, board members and applicants for zoning changes should
be wary of ex parte communications that carry risk of disclosure of confidential
information. See Patricia E. Salkin, Legal Ethics and Land-Use Planning, 30 URB. L.
383, 385 (1998) (concerning especially those who are not parties to dispute at
hand).
155. Julia Driver, The History of Utilitarianism, STAN. ENCY. PHIL. (Sept. 22,
2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/ [https://
perma.cc/XU5L-D6LY] (attributing this to Classical Utilitarians of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill).
156. Robert McGee, Property Rights vs. Utilitarianism: Two Views of Ethics, 27
REASON PAPERS 87, 92 (2004), retrieved from https://reasonpapers.com/pdf/27/
rp_27_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/KLN6-F9YK] (quoting English utilitarian Henry
Sidgwick).
157. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1849, 1867 (2007) (noting property rights may be justified by utilitarianism easily by looking at increase of welfare). But see id. at 1876 (“The immorality of the original act of deprivation trumps all considerations of utility that can
be arrayed on the other side. Popular morality seems to concur.”).
158. See Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, STAN. ENCY.
PHIL. (Oct. 17, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/
#DeoThe [https://perma.cc/LCW4-4JKE] (noting direct opposition to consequentialism, which asserts actions are morally assessed solely by results they bring).
159. See David Misselbrook, Duty, Kant and Deontology, 63 BRITISH J. GEN.
PRACT. 211, 211 (Apr. 2013), retrieved from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC3609464/ [https://perma.cc/2KZF-UU29] (noting philosopher Immanuel Kant’s idea of absolute duties).
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icy practices like comprehensive planning, perhaps deontology is
better at helping government resolve its conflicts with discrete
populations or special interests in golf course disputes – although
these two theories of ethics are not necessarily at odds with each
other.160
Lastly, ethical considerations permeate through arguments
about golf’s proper place in today’s society, in which some critics
debate whether the sport should continue to exist at all.161 For example, golf has had a not-so-distant history of segregation, and
surveys of professionals have revealed a lukewarm attitude towards
increasing diversity.162 Alongside these observations of racial and
sexual inequality within the sport, critics are also quick to note the
political and classist undertones of golf culture itself.163 Interest160. See Timothy M. Sandefur & Steven Greenhut, Eminent Domain, INDEP.
INST. (Jan. 31, 2006), https://www.independent.org/events/transcript.asp?id=114
[https://perma.cc/TA5V-NEDF] (identifying deontology, which “says that an official has unbreakable obligation,” as one justification operating alongside obligation to “promote good consequences for the greatest number” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
161. See, e.g., Margot Harris, This woman is going viral for her hilarious anti-golf
TikToks, but she’s not in it just for the laughs, INSIDER (May 29, 2020), https://
www.insider.com/anti-golf-tiktok-viral-abbie-richards-2020-5 [https://perma.cc/
U3Y3-LVQF] (noting social, economic, environmental, and political implications
of golf); Jordan Pearson, Reclaim the Golf Courses, VICE (Mar. 1, 2018), https://
www.vice.com/en/article/7x7qqe/reclaim-the-golf-courses [https://perma.cc/
E8QE-86C] (advocating for total ban on golf, urging reclamation of golf course
property as accessible public spaces “without destroying anything else in the process, except a hobby for people who scrape profits from the work that the rest of us
do”).
162. See Randy Cohen, Is Golf Unethical?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2009), https://
ethicist.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/is-golf-unethical/ [https://perma.cc/
748B-QYD4] (describing golf culture “redolent of a gated community” and criticizing male golf stars’ complacency in sexually segregated clubs); see also Maurice
Allen, Being black in a white sport, GOLF DIGEST (June 2, 2020), https://
www.golfdigest.com/story/being-black-in-a-white-sport [https://perma.cc/HVZ2Q8NL] (detailing African-American professional’s experience with racial inequality in golf, recalling “[o]ften I’m the only black man in a competition . . . I’ve had
competitors and their families straight up rain n-words and racial slurs on me without remorse”).
163. See, e.g., Nick Paumgarten, Inside the Cultish Dreamworld of Augusta National, NEW YORKER (June 14, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2019/06/24/inside-the-cultish-dreamworld-of-augusta-national [https://
perma.cc/QF4K-KGT9] (characterizing August National as “oligarchs’ playground
. . . for the rich and powerful” with plenty of white male C.E.O. members); see also
Beatrice Harvey, Power, Pollution, and Golf, PRINDLE POST (Apr. 18, 2019), https://
www.prindlepost.org/2019/04/power-pollution-and-golf/ [https://perma.cc/
H3GK-L8Y3] (observing tendency for golfers to be wealthy “and that the golf
course is a place where hierarchy and prestige are not only respected but built into
the very foundation of the culture”). Harvey further equates golf culture to capitalist power with former President Donald Trump as prime example, citing “elitist
attitudes and expectations” that continue to shadow over the sport. Id. (describing
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ingly, players try to leave politics aside when on the green, but partisan bias may still appear in golfers’ views on proper etiquette,
norms of playing, and perhaps most importantly, whether the status
quo of private club exclusivity is acceptable.164 Finally, critics cite
the detriment to the environment that golf brings, notably through
water depletion and pollution.165 Proponents respond by claiming
that courses offer a secondary use as wildlife refuge areas, though
no clear consensus remains on this rebuttal.166 These are just examples of how golf is no stranger to ethical dilemmas, and therefore dead course decisionmakers may need to look past the
immediate property owners’ interests to the concerns or experiences of outlying impacted community members who may also
have stake in the land use.167

golf courses as “private spaces of leisure for powerful men, a place for unethical
behavior sheltered from the public eye and more traditional structures of power”).
164. See Larry Bohannan, Is it possible to take politics out of golf these days?, DESERT
SUN (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.desertsun.com/story/sports/golf/2017/02/27/
possible-take-politics-out-golf-these-days/98479546/ [https://perma.cc/8YJRKLDW] (idealizing golf as “arena where partisanship could be suspended for 18
holes,” noting both former Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump’s “unquestioned great love for the game”); see also Sam Weinman, How Republicans and
Democrats differ . . . on the golf course, GOLF DIGEST (Nov. 6, 2018), https://
www.golfdigest.com/story/how-republicans-and-democrats-differ-on-the-golfcourse [https://perma.cc/ZH6X-838H] (describing golf as “politically agnostic,”
but comparing survey results showing conservative golfers’ tendency to follow rules
more closely and to allow private club to “do whatever it wants”). This view on
private clubs’ rights is roughly analogous to political arguments on “state’s rights”
that should be free from outside agency interference. See id. (contrasting liberal
golfers’ desire to uproot status quo of private club exclusivity).
165. See Sewell, supra note 19, at 342-43 (noting usage of 312,000 gallons of
water daily for watering golf courses and alerting risk of chemical runoff into local
water); see also Harvey, supra note 163 (providing harmful environmental effects of
golf balls, sheer size of acreage, and pesticide use).
166. See Sewell, supra note 19, at 334-36 (describing benefit of open acreage to
bird and bat conservation). But see Harvey, supra note 163 (conceding “no clear
consensus” on biological conservation and ecosystem management, and disruption
of wildlife is inevitable upon building of course). This lack of consensus is partially
due to the difficulty in measuring quantifiable, objective impacts on golf courses,
compared to the qualitative, intangible benefits that guide the arguments on both
sides. See Miquel Salgot & Josefina C. Tapias, Golf courses: Environmental impacts, 6
TOURISM & HOSP. RESEARCH 218, 219 (May 2006), https://www.jstor.org/stable/
23745310?seq=1 (adding that “environment” itself is also complex, subjective
definition).
167. See Golf and your community, R&A, https://www.randa.org/Sustainability/
Communities/Golf-and-your-community [https://perma.cc/7TBK-CCP6] (last visited Mar. 5, 2021) (describing how golf course managers can improve community
relations in face of local antagonism).
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III. HAZARDS & HANDICAPS: THREE CASE STUDIES
Three distinct scenarios from three different states offer a
glimpse into how the land use controls arise in intra-community
conflicts.168 In Ohio, an eminent domain dispute is en route to the
state supreme court, involving the state historical society’s attempt
to reclaim Native American burial grounds from a private golf
course to open for full public access.169 In South Carolina, a wave
of golf course closures has led to vicious debates between residents,
developers, and local government over the necessity of rezoning to
accommodate redevelopment.170 Lastly, an Arizona community
has faced frustration over failed performance of a covenant requiring continued use of an unkempt property as a golf course.171 As
follows in Section IV, these case studies demonstrate whether these
land use controls can achieve fruitful use of the golf course property in an ethical way.172
A. Buckeye Birdie: Ohio as an Eminent Domain Pioneer
Eminent domain allows government the unique power to intervene and take control over a property dispute where interests
clash.173 The standout case from Ohio that demonstrates this inter168. See SEAN NOLON, ONA FERGUSON & PAT FIELD, LAND IN CONFLICT: MANAGRESOLVING LAND USE DISPUTES xiii (2013), retrieved from https://
www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/land-in-conflict-chp.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/Y7JM-KXGY] (arguing such disputes indicative of “reality that communities have many choices about how to handle controversial land use decisions . . .
[y]et these legal requirements serve only as procedural minimums and do not preclude the addition of more collaborative forms of decision making”).
169. For further discussion on the dispute between the Ohio History Connection and Moundbuilders Country Club over the access to the Octagon Earthworks
on the golf course, see infra notes 173-183 and accompanying text. See also Membership, Moundbuilders Country Club, https://www.moundbuilderscc.com/Default.
aspx?p=dynamicModule&pageid=367883&ssid=280002&vnf=1 [https://perma.cc/
EG6X-Z4V3] (last visited Mar. 5, 2021) (listing private membership options).
170. For further discussion of the parties and factors involved in the tentative
zoning and planning decisions, see infra notes 184-198 and the accompanying text.
171. For further discussion of judicial enforcement of the covenant on the
Ahwatukee Lakes Golf Course property, see infra notes 199-211 and the accompanying text.
172. For further discussion on ideal government strategy to balance efficient
land repurposing with sensitivity to community concerns, see infra notes 212-294
and the accompanying text.
173. See Ohio History Connection, About Us, OHIO HISTORY CTR. (2021),
https://www.ohiohistory.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/H79T-ZSJG] (last visited Jan. 5, 2021) (noting status as 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization). Rather than
the typical eminent domain proceeding commenced by governmental subdivision
like a municipality, the state’s nonprofit historical society initiated the lease termination in the Moundbuilders dispute. See Jeremy Pelzer, Ohio Supreme Court to decide
whether state historical society can take over golf course built on ancient earthworks, CLEVEING AND
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vention is a dispute involving a sacred Native American architectural site beneath Moundbuilders Country Club in Newark.174
Known as the Octagon Earthworks, the site is part of perhaps “the
largest, best-preserved and most precise geometric earthworks in
the world,” but the golf club extended its existing lease over the site
until 2078.175 In May 2019, the Licking County Common Pleas
Court authorized the Ohio History Connection’s (“OHC”) use of
eminent domain over the site, upholding OHC’s “public duty to
operate, protect and maintain the Octagon Earthworks and promote the state memorial for public use.”176 The following January
2020, a state appellate court affirmed, demanding that the golf
club, “in the interest of optimal usage and preservation, now needs
to give way to full public access” to the Octagon Earthworks.177
Then in July, the Ohio Supreme Court announced it would take
the case on further appeal.178
The Ohio Constitution provides that “[p]rivate property shall
[n]ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare.”179
Ohio case law interprets this as only allowing the exercise of emiLAND.COM (July 8, 2020), https://www.cleveland.com/open/2020/07/ohio-supreme-court-to-decide-whether-state-historical-society-can-take-over-golf-coursebuilt-on-ancient-earthworks.html [https://perma.cc/32UB-3SDS] (reporting on
state historical society’s eminent domain right).
174. See Chris Gaitten, The Battle Over the Octagon Earthworks, COLUMBUS
MONTHLY (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.columbusmonthly.com/news/20191008/
battle-over-octagon-earthworks [https://perma.cc/UAU7-N7R7] (accounting history of site and golf course).
175. See id. (noting extension was quiet maneuver in 1997).
176. See Kent Mallett, Story of the year No. 7: Judge rules OHC can reclaim Octagon
Mounds; decision appealed, N EWARK A DVOCATE (Dec. 27, 2019), https://
www.newarkadvocate.com/story/news/2019/12/27/judge-rules-ohc-can-reclaimoctagon-mounds-moundbuilders-appeals/2710132001/ [https://perma.cc/B8RZ5PR7] (summarizing timeline of dispute up to appellate oral argument in November 2019).
177. State ex rel. Ohio History Connection v. Moundbuilders Country Club
Co., 143 N.E.3d 614, 622 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020) (finding necessity for OHC’s taking
of property for public purpose); see also Kent Mallett, Moundbuilders loses appeal in
effort to keep golf course at Newark earthworks, NEWARK ADVOCATE (Jan. 30, 2020, 2:29
PM), https://www.newarkadvocate.com/story/news/2020/01/30/
moundbuilders-loses-appeal-effort-keep-golf-course-property/4619998002/
[https://perma.cc/83AX-MRT5] (summarizing golf club’s losing argument and
reporting on OHC’s positive response to ruling).
178. See Kent Mallett, Ohio Supreme Court to hear Moundbuilders’ appeal of rulings
on lease of Hopewell site, NEWARK ADVOCATE (Jul. 7, 2020, 6:30 PM) https://
www.newarkadvocate.com/story/news/2020/07/07/ohio-supreme-court-hearmoundbuilders-appeal-golf-course-lease/5389923002/ [https://perma.cc/P5GV72JU] (predicting three to six months before court hears arguments and nine
months to year until final decision).
179. OH. CONST. art. I, § 19 (requiring just compensation for immediate
seizure).
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nent domain powers “for the common good.”180 Yet, the necessity
of the exercise for public good appears rather broad, as Ohio
courts understand the public use requirement as “reasonably convenient or useful to the public . . . .”181 In the most recent
Moundbuilders case from January 2020, the Ohio Court of Appeals
found public access to the Native American remnants sufficient to
allow eminent domain, and likened the site to a “public park” with
presumed public use.182 Upcoming in April 2021, defendant-appellant Moundbuilders Country Club will argue in front of the Ohio
Supreme Court that OHC failed to meet its burden in proving
“good faith” in its appraisal offer, and that the district court failed
to weigh competing public interests in finding that the taking was
“necessary” for the public good.183
B. Concerned Carolinians: South Carolina’s Zoning Disputes
Zoning provides an element of flexibility to both government
and private citizens, as there is less of an imperative for government
to aim towards specific projects or populations and there is more
room for community sway.184 However, as golf courses meet their
demise in even the promised land of South Carolina, disputes in
zoning decisions plague the people, as this flexibility in options results in discord.185 Across the state, golf courses continue to lose
180. State ex rel. Ohio History Connection, 143 N.E.3d at 621 (providing eminent
domain power inherent in state).
181. Id. (quoting Sunoco Pipeline L.P. v. Teter, 63 N.E.3d 160, 176 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2016)) (noting appellee Ohio History Connection’s argument that acquisition of golf course lease was “necessary”).
182. See id. at 622 (finding Moundbuilders did not meet burden of showing
lack of necessity).
183. See Merit Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 2-4, State ex rel. Ohio History
Connection, et al. v. The Moundbuilders Country Club Co., No. 2020-0191 (Ohio
Sept. 28, 2020) (arguing misapplication of good faith requirement “places in jeopardy the rights of every property holder in Ohio who owns real estate that is desired by the government” and district court’s elimination of necessity element
applied to public use goes against established eminent domain precedence); see
also Ohio History Connection, Octagon Earthworks Update, 1.17.21, OHIO HISTORY
CTR. (2021), https://www.ohiohistory.org/about-us/newsroom/august-2018-(1)/
octagon-earthworks [https://perma.cc/QPC2-V9SB] (last visited Mar. 1, 2021)
(notifying of oral argument in front of Ohio Supreme Court on April 13, 2021).
184. See Guide to Land Use Planning for South Carolina, S.C. ASS’N OF CTYS. at 7
(2017), https://www.sccounties.org/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/
guide-to-land-use-planning.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JXF-2NT8] (noting South Carolina counties’ flexibility in deciding “extent of planning, zoning, and land development regulation necessary to meet local needs”).
185. See South Carolina, T O P 100 G O L F C O U R S E S , https://
www.top100golfcourses.com/golf-courses/north-america/usa/south-carolina
[https://perma.cc/W9AT-847Z] (last visited Oct. 25, 2020) (acknowledging state’s
tourism board “flaunts South Carolina as the No. 1 golfing state in America”).
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profits, shift ownership, and harbor tensions between developers
and residents.186 At the Island West community in Beaufort
County, residents “vehemently” opposed a developer’s initiative to
rezone the golf course so as to allow a hotel, commercial buildings,
and patio homes on the course.187 The private operator of the golf
course confirmed the sale of the course to the developer, resulting
from the golf course losing money.188 In the same county, Sanctuary Club sold at a foreclosure auction in January 2020.189 With a
finalized recent change in ownership of the yearlong overgrown
club, residents struggle with general uncertainty and lack of communication about development plans.190 Near Columbia, Windermere Club filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in July 2020 to avoid
foreclosure, and now an outside investor may help continue operations.191 Neighborhood groups oppose residential development
but have attempted to work out a solution with the owner.192 These
are just a few courses that exemplify an ongoing trend from prior
years of bankruptcies, closures, and rezoning controversies around
the state.193
Zoning decisions must comply with the South Carolina Local
Government Comprehensive Planning Enabling Act of 1994.194 To
186. See Kacen Bayless, Bluffton area golf course could be rezoned and developed.
Neighbors are fighting back, I S L A N D P A C K E T (Mar. 2, 2020), https://
www.islandpacket.com/news/local/article240699271.html (mentioning two other
courses were auctioned this past year due to financial problems).
187. See id. (citing concerns in traffic, construction, flooding, and loss of
property values).
188. See id. (reporting no final development proposal and no submission of
rezoning plans to county).
189. See Stephen Fastenau, Closed Beaufort Co. golf course has raised questions
about possible development, I S L A N D P A C K E T (Mar. 10, 2020), https://
www.islandpacket.com/news/business/real-estate-news/article241030836.html
(stating closure in January 2019).
190. See id. (attributing uncertainty to golf business in general since Great
Recession).
191. See Mike Fitts, Amid tough times for golf, another troubled course near Columbia
could make way for homes, P O S T A N D C O U R I E R (Jul. 9, 2020), https://
www.postandcourier.com/news/amid-tough-times-for-golf-another-troubledcourse-near-columbia-could-make-way-for-homes/article_5bea8c74-c20a-11eaad85-eb7921b48032.html [https://perma.cc/2J2P-5VQF] (noting developer’s interest in nearby acres of undeveloped land, but with potential need to use course
land as well).
192. See id. (including solutions such as continuing course operation or leaving land undeveloped for conservation or recreation purposes).
193. See Jeff Wilkinson, Northeast residents up in arms over plan to build 100s of
homes on former golf course, STATE (Apr. 22, 2019) https://www.thestate.com/latestnews/article229366129.html (reporting on “political showdown,” i.e. rezoning of
Crickentree Club).
194. See S.C. CODE § 6-29-310 (1976) et seq. (providing state’s process for planning and zoning).
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rezone a parcel of land – or amend a zoning regulation or map –
the governing authority or its delegated planning commission must
hold a public hearing on the amendment, with conspicuous prior
notice.195 The comprehensive plan, through which zoning ordinances exist, must be reviewed every five years and updated every
ten years.196 The state does not have a constitutional requirement
to rezone a municipality in whole at a single time.197 This process
of citizen involvement is an asset to the practice itself as it may allow
for more accurate representation of the community at large,
though perhaps at the expense of efficiency of repurposing
altogether.198
C. Dry & Dead: Arizona’s Covenant Gridlock
As an outlier compared to takings and zoning, covenants involve legal issues that may exist outside the purview of government
action.199 To see how covenants may cause years of confusion absent non-judicial government involvement, consider one Arizona
developer’s legal battles.200 A court ruling in 2019 marked the intended end of a longstanding dispute concerning the dilapidated
Ahwatukee Lakes Golf Course.201 In Swain v. Bixby Village Golf
Course, Inc., the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed that a covenant
required continued restoration and operation of a golf course on
195. See id. § 6-29-760 (noting governing authority may authorize planning
commission to hold hearing in its place).
196. See id. § 6-29-510(E) (“The local planning commission shall review the
comprehensive plan . . . to determine whether changes in the amount, king, or
direction of development . . . make it desirable to make additions or amendments
to the plan.”).
197. See Momeier v. John McAlister, Inc., 231 S.C. 526, 531 (finding city could
rezone small area, “so long as its action is not arbitrary or unreasonable”).
198. But see Casey Watson, Anger, tears fill room after Indian Wells Golf Course
rezoning approved by planning commission, WMBF (Apr. 4, 2019), https://
www.wmbfnews.com/2019/04/05/anger-tears-fill-room-after-indian-wells-rezoning-decision/ (noting heavy participation of homeowners against rezoning who
spoke at meeting and lost in 151-142 vote).
199. See Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 559 (2006) (upholding restriction
in covenant that was more stringent than zoning ordinance, reasoning enforcing
intent of parties involved is “cardinal principle”).
200. For further discussion of Ahwatukee and Club West delays and nonperformance of covenants despite court order, see infra notes 201-211 and accompanying text.
201. See Danielle Miller, Court of Appeals rules Ahwatukee golf course must be restored, FOX 10 PHX. (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.fox10phoenix.com/news/courtof-appeals-rules-ahwatukee-golf-course-my [https://perma.cc/7BLG-RGZE] (interviewing residents around golf course).
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the property.202 However, the feud continued, as an Arizona Superior Court judge found the owner ignored three separate restoration orders.203 Now, the case is on the docket for petition for
certiorari by the United States Supreme Court.204
The situation unfolded in May 2013, when the owner corporation Bixby Village Golf Course, Inc. closed the golf course.205 The
following year, plaintiffs sued the Bixby corporation, claiming the
closure violated the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions declaration as part of the property.206 In the years before the Court of
Appeals decision, ownership transferred to an investment LLC,
upon which the duty to uphold the covenant was found.207 Around
this time, the president of the Bixby corporation, Wilson Gee, was
dealing with another golf course closure at Club West Golf Course,
which had been effectively abandoned since 2016 due to Gee’s financial mismanagement.208 Club West has since shifted ownership
and is now under a new plan to minimize development while maximizing recreational amenities.209 However, both Ahwatukee Lakes
and Club West remain vacant, lacking direction and vision on how
to convert the property use.210 When golf course disputes reach
202. See Swain v. Bixby Vill. Golf Course, Inc., 247 Ariz. 405, 414 (2019) (upholding covenant as matter of public policy).
203. See Paul Maryniak, Judge finds Lakes course owner defied restoration orders,
AHWATUKEE FOOTHILLS NEWS (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.ahwatukee.com/news/
article_5593d0fc-e702-11ea-9013-cf7084f63ad1.html [https://perma.cc/S9UJABGW] (reporting on sanctions against owner).
204. See ALCR, LLC v. Linda W. Swain, 450 P.3d 270 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019),
cert. denied, 2020 WL 6551786 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2020) (No. 20-288) (showing docket
proceedings).
205. See Swain, 247 Ariz. at 408 (“[Owner] placed a barbed-wire fence around
the perimeter, drained the lakes, shut off all power, stripped the sod off the
greens, and removed hundreds of irrigation heads.”).
206. See id. at 407-08 (noting grantor’s intention for covenant).
207. See id. at 410-12 (construing covenant to “give effect to the intentions of
the parties ascertained from the language used in the instrument, or the circumstances surrounding creation of the servitude, and to carry out the purpose for
which it was created” (quoting Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 557 (2006))).
208. See Paul Maryniak, Club West future sinks again into uncertainty, AHWATUKEE
F OOTHILLS N EWS (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.ahwatukee.com/news/article_3109e478-0b0d-11ea-a442-c7ba627f28f1.html [https://perma.cc/Y6QL-EKUP]
(reporting on Gee’s high water bills as catalyst for 2016 shutdown).
209. See AZRE, Here are the revitalization plans for Club West Golf Course land, AZ
BIG MEDIA (Jul. 3, 2020), https://azbigmedia.com/real-estate/commercial-real-estate/here-are-the-revitalization-plans-for-club-west-golf-course-land/ [https://
perma.cc/29CT-XHC5] (reporting on committee meetings and dialogue with
community members).
210. See Andy Lenartz, Federal outdoors act: hope for Lakes, Club West, AHWATUKEE
FOOTHILLS NEWS (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.ahwatukee.com/opinion/article_6c442f10-e23c-11ea-a568-839a506a4d96.html [https://perma.cc/8GFE-Q62G]
(finding hope in increased federal funding).
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crossroads like these, challengers can consult the government by
way of the judiciary, which may be better equipped to resolve disputes between private parties.211
IV. FORE! AN ANALYSIS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LAND USE
CONTROLS IN GOLF COURSE REPURPOSING
Of these three land use mechanisms that consistently arise in
dead golf course disputes, each practice serves different interests by
yielding varying outcomes – namely, the transfer of ownership to
government through eminent domain, the regulated use of the
property through zoning, and the enforcement of existing uses
through covenants.212 However, when considering the issue of how
to transform a dead course into an overall benefit to the surrounding community, the land use control that deserves the most use going forward is eminent domain.213 Once government acquires the
idle property, decisions involving appropriate future land use or enforceability of preexisting conditions may proceed with fewer obstacles.214 A government taking may be the most extreme option, but
the inference follows that subsequent government actions will be
less controversial and better informed, provided the public involves
itself in voicing its desired outcomes within the community.215
A. Driving the Change: Eminent Domain as Necessary Evil
Unlike dying courses, eminent domain as a practice is likely
not going away anytime soon.216 Members of the general public
must therefore understand that the “public use” requirement exists
quite literally in their favor, and that states are at least attempting to
211. See Auther v. Furst, No. 1 CA-CV 07-0405, 2008 WL 4965347 at *4 (Ariz.
App. 2008) (recognizing no “case or controversy” standing requirement in Arizona
state courts, meaning those with “a direct stake in the outcome of the controversy”
may challenge covenant).
212. For further discussion on legal standards and purposes of takings, zoning, and covenants, see supra notes 51-137 and accompanying text.
213. See generally Stephen F. Broadus IV, Ten Years After: Kelo v. City of New
London and the Not So Probable Consequences, 34 MISS. C.L. REV. 323, 331-344 (2015)
(surveying states’ eminent domain legislation and noting its permissible use in
abandoned and blighted properties and public nuisances).
214. See id. at 330 (inferring state eminent domain legislation “demonstrates
that states are unwilling to go as far as the Supreme Court did in Kelo” in upholding eminent domain use).
215. See Somin, supra note 74, at 2108-11 (providing survey data of public’s
overwhelmingly negative opinion of Kelo).
216. See, e.g., City of Omaha v. Tract No. 1, 778 N.W.2d 122, 127 (Neb. Ct.
App. 2010) (describing general historical justification for eminent domain’s existence as “sovereign power which exists independent of the [state] Constitution”).
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craft legislative reform to ensure the non-abuse of government takings power.217 A broad reading of public use or public purpose
would essentially yield results that generally benefit communities at
large in numbers, though perhaps at the expense of the smaller,
more immediate or intimately invested communities – and this is
the exact result expected from a utilitarian ethics standpoint.218
Yet, difficulty lies in discerning which community has the greater
influence, either through size or political power, which thereafter
raises questions as to whose interests should be prioritized.219
Thus, in potential tiebreaker cases, the prevailing interest could arguably inhere within the party whose interest or stake in the land
itself is more unique or precious.220
In considering the Moundbuilders dispute, common sense can
lead one to the conclusion that a unique Native American burial
site likely holds more concentrated irreplaceable value to that side
than the land does to the golf course owner.221 This falls in line
217. See id. at 2154 (noting general public’s overall unawareness of post-Kelo
eminent domain legislation); see also Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 571
(1956) (“Our controlling decisions are to the effect that ‘public use’ means just
that and private property cannot be taken except for public use, without the consent of the owner.”). But see id. at 571-72 (describing range of strictness in how
broadly ‘public use’ may be defined, with narrower definitions more protective of
private property from government).
218. See, e.g., Steven Mintz, Eminent Domain and Google’s Proposed Campus in San
Jose, ETHICS SAGE (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.ethicssage.com/2017/12/eminentdomain-and-googles-proposed-campus-in-san-jose.html#:~:text=another%20ethical%20reasoning%20method%20is%20Utilitarianism%2C%20sometimes
%20known%20as%20Consequentialism.&text=IN%20eminent%20domain%20
cases%2C%20it,greater%20benefits%20for%20the%20community [https://
perma.cc/VF68-UWPV] (noting issue with utilitarianism is “ends justifies the
means” approach, which may not contemplate that increased economic value can
cost community’s quality of life).
219. See Ohio History Connection, Newark Earthworks, OHIO HISTORY CTR.
(2020), https://www.ohiohistory.org/visit/museum-and-site-locator/newark-earthworks [https://perma.cc/Z9TB-QX7X] (describing significance of grounds to
Hopewell Culture).
220. See Hopewell Culture, NAT’L PARK SERV. (May 24, 2018), https://
www.nps.gov/hocu/learn/historyculture/hopewell-ceremonial-earthworks.htm
[https://perma.cc/V2J7-EDLY] (detailing initiative and process for World Heritage Site status for greater Ohio earthworks network, signifying earthworks’ “such
outstanding universal value that its conservation is important for current and future generations”).
221. See Interior Proposes Hopewell Ceremonial Earthworks as Nomination to World
Heritage List, U.S. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR (May 24, 2018), https://www.doi.gov/
pressreleases/interior-proposes-hopewell-ceremonial-earthworks-nominationworld-heritage-list [https://perma.cc/QZ8K-2UQ2] (reporting DOI’s proposed
nomination of Octagon Earthworks and greater “Ceremonial Earthworks” for
UNESCO World Heritage Site status); see also Heritage List, UNESCO, http://
whc.unesco.org/en/list/ [https://perma.cc/N29T-KK6T] (last visited Mar. 2,
2021) (listing current twenty-four World Heritage sites in United States of comparable universal value).
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with the deontological theory to respect human dignity, especially
in contexts where one community has an arguably more special
connection to the real property itself, compared to just a financial
interest.222 Government should exercise its discretion in directing
the proper conveyance of property as a sort of mediator, achievable
through its sovereign takings power.223 However, danger for abuse
of discretion lies in this suggestion to investigate the value that each
competing party attaches to the property.224 Such an inquiry implicates concerns from other areas of law that could derail the current
takings and eminent domain standards, for instance, by awakening
First Amendment concerns.225
An additional consideration to the overall effectiveness of eminent domain in bringing benefit to the intended populations is the
payment of just compensation.226 OHC offered the owners
$800,000 for compensation, based on a fair market, good faith appraisal, which is an ongoing issue in the litigation.227 This dilemma
of choosing which compensation amount to offer raises an essential
question: how can “just” compensation or “fair” market value adequately account for the non-monetary, subjective value attached to
222. See Babbitt v. Youpee: Allotment and the Continuing Loss of Native American
Property and Rights to Devise, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 265, 265 (1997) (noting history of
American ownership heritage “resulted in the disenfranchisement of Native American tribes from their most essential element: their land”).
223. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 370 (1875) (recognizing government’s sovereign eminent domain right as right to purchase and condemn). But
see id. at 373-74 (noting right is for government “to take private property for its own
public uses, and not for those of another”).
224. Cf. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 687, 703-04 (Jan. 1990) (considering irreplaceability of real property, noting
insufficiency of damages to compensate for specific value individual places on
property).
225. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (declaring “[c]ontent-based laws–those that target speech based on its communicative
content–are presumptively unconstitutional” and thus subject to strict scrutiny); see
also Ben Adams & Cynthia Barmore, Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the Courts After
Hobby Lobby, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 59, 62-64 (Nov. 2014) (describing inquiry
into First Amendment litigants’ sincerity of religious beliefs).
226. See Paige Boldt, Condemning Fair Market Value: An Appraisal of Eminent Domain’s “Just Compensation”, 1 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 131, 137 (2012) (suggesting
Fifth Amendment imposes “public use” and “just compensation” as two distinct
limitations on government’s eminent domain authority that give private parties
“protection of individual liberty against [sovereignty]”).
227. See State ex rel. Ohio History Connection v. Moundbuilders Country
Club Company, 143 N.E.3d 614, 619-20 (affirming trial court’s finding of no bad
faith even if OHC received separate appraisal that valued site more than double);
see also Ohio Supreme Court sets date for ancient burial mound case, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Jan. 15, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/newark-ohio-eminent-domain-courts4c879646921e96f1051843a2eb78f9e8 (reporting Ohio Supreme Court will hear arguments on April 13 whether OHC made good faith offer).
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a specific parcel of real property?228 An analysis of the role and
proper valuation of “just compensation” is beyond the scope of this
Comment’s focus, although an idea relevant to the Moundbuilders
dispute is that just compensation aims to make up for losses in real
estate development and investment, which may be easier to provide
to the party operating a golf course than it would to the party with
the more spiritual connection to the land that money may not
fulfill.229
Another complicating factor in the Moundbuilders case is that
the dispute did not involve a closure of a golf course, or even a
government entity initiating the proceedings in a traditional sense;
rather, the private course is still in operation as it markets its design
around the earthworks, and OHC is a nonprofit entity, not dissimilar from the entity at issue in Kelo.230 Yet, these marked differences
do not detract from the benefits that eminent domain may provide
for dead courses.231 Namely, eminent domain could be a way for
government to deliberately decide how a parcel of property should
be used, and the Moundbuilders case is an example of how this may
unfold in instances of competing interests.232 The large caveat with
this strategy, however, is that the public use must actually be public
and “not to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals,”
though Kelo helped lower this burden for the government by expanding the definition of public use.233
228. See Maria M. Maciá, Pinning Down Subjective Valuations: A Well-Being Analysis Approach to Eminent Domain, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 945, 951 (2016) (positing idea
that monetary valuations may not make individual property owner whole).
229. See Aaron N. Gruen, Takings, Just Compensation, and the Efficient Use of
Land, Urban, and Environmental Resources, 33 URB. L. REV. 517, 529 (2001) (comparing uniqueness of real property to market demands and consumer preferences
involved with real estate investment and development).
230. See Clare Roth, Ohio History Connection Wins Eminent Domain Fight Over
Newark Earthworks, WOSU (May 13, 2019), https://radio.wosu.org/post/ohio-history-connection-wins-eminent-domain-fight-over-newark-earthworks#stream/0
[https://perma.cc/82W6-7MU4] (noting country club leased land from OHC
since 1930s and OHC’s inability to acquire lease since then); see also MOUNDBUILDERS COUNTRY CLUB, The Course, MCC, https://www.moundbuilderscc.com/
Default.aspx?p=dynamicModule&pageid=367880&ssid=279999&vnf=1 [https://
perma.cc/N8P2-J2R5] (last visited Jan. 5, 2021) (describing uniqueness of own
golf course within country club).
231. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (indicating public welfare is broad and inclusive of physical, aesthetic, and monetary values, and eminent domain is “merely the means to the end”).
232. But see Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 477-78 (2005)
(limiting eminent domain from being used to confer private benefit upon private
party, or to disguise private benefit under “public benefit”).
233. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (prohibiting
“purely private” takings).
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Although rapid changes currently surround the state of golf,
the government’s use of eminent domain to acquire the dead
courses does not appear as a common occurrence, perhaps due to
the public disdain for the practice itself and the potential it has in
causing irreconcilable conflict between the interested parties.234
Nonetheless, instances still appear of eminent domain use over golf
courses.235 For example, in Chester County, Pennsylvania, a school
board voted to acquire part of Meadow Brook Golf Club, despite
opposition from the club’s owners.236 After almost a year of further
delays and objections filed against the school district, the Chester
County Common Pleas Court nonetheless upheld the acquisition in
2014.237 Aside from community backlash, perhaps governments
hesitate to use eminent domain over golf courses due to a lack of
resources to undertake such large projects.238 Denver, Colorado
faced a lawsuit upon using eminent domain to take thirty-five acres
of a golf course to build a flood prevention system – leading to a
multi-million dollar loss for the city in 2019.239 In Florida, the
234. See, e.g., Eminent Domain, NAT’L GOLF COURSE OWNERS ASS’N, https://
www.ngcoa.org/info-centers/advocacy/taxation/eminent-domain [https://
perma.cc/3439-NP22] (last visited Feb. 7, 2021) (providing organization’s monitoring of potential eminent domain proceedings against golf course owners); see
also No heroes, many villains in Phoenixville eminent domain dispute, DAILY LOCAL NEWS
(Dec. 7, 2013), https://www.dailylocal.com/news/national/no-heroes-many-villains-in-phoenixville-eminent-domain-dispute/article_6539cb90-1dc7-538f-aa1e88ce7af72292.html (“[E]very side is a little bit at fault in this twisted process [of
school board taking golf course] . . . [E]minent domain is a difficult issue for any
community . . . .”).
235. For further discussion of examples of eminent domain use against golf
course parcels, see infra notes 236-240 and accompanying text.
236. See Frank Otto, UPDATED: Judge rules against golf course in eminent domain
case, DAILY LOCAL NEWS (June 30, 2014), https://www.dailylocal.com/news/national/updated-judge-rules-against-golf-course-in-eminent-domain-case/article_c33833fa-fa85-511f-8520-f409f51ea6d4.html [https://perma.cc/8CBG-69J8]
(citing school board’s posited purpose to build elementary school and early learning center).
237. See Frank Otto, Phoenixville’s Meadow Brook Golf Club to shut down per court
order, MERCURY (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.pottsmerc.com/news/phoenixvillesmeadow-brook-golf-club-to-shut-down-per-court-order/article_ebb28d92-eedf-5f9eb317-b2bdf31103a7.html (adding plans for school site to include maintenance
building and athletic fields).
238. But see Shaila Dewan, Eminent Domain: A Long Shot Against Blight, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 11, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/business/in-richmond-california-a-long-shot-against-blight.html [https://perma.cc/XR3V-2KQR]
(reporting on city’s use of eminent domain as attempt to ameliorate mortgage
crisis, with posited public purpose to prevent foreclosures and blight).
239. See Editorial Board, Editorial: Denver must stick to its guns to protect Park Hill
open space, DENVER POST (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/11/
13/park-hill-golf-club-open-space/ [https://perma.cc/Y9B9-HEE7] (finding liability in addition to city’s initial two million dollars spent in 1997 for perpetual conservation easement).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021

37

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 6

486

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28: p. 449

remediation of long-term use of chemicals and herbicides at dead
courses adds extra environmental concerns that may further complicate eminent domain strategy.240 Yet, these issues of strapped
resources or environmental externalities may become less of a
problem the sooner a decision is made for the proper use of the
course.241
Despite this Comment’s advocacy for increased use of eminent
domain, the ethical concerns over the proper role of government
in society are most pointed in this context, as many people presumably oppose government taking their property without having a fair
chance for bargaining.242 Those in favor and in opposition of eminent domain have appreciable arguments – perceivably, proponents’ assertion that taking property may lead to greater amenities
and economic opportunities, or critics’ assertion that government
should not liberally impose cost and delay burdens upon undeserving seized property owners.243 In the case of the disgruntled citizen
who falls victim to eminent domain, there exists a sentiment that
government is not treating humans with respect to their dignities
and rights – deontological principles in short.244 While the state
may succeed under utilitarianism by ultimately benefitting a greater
amount of constituents as a whole, the individuals harmed in the
process demonstrate the conflict in deontology.245 Notwithstanding this ethical conundrum, the public should at least demand as
240. See, e.g., Benjamin Paley & Dan Christensen, Arsenic and old sludge: A
Hollywood environmental story, F L A . B U L L D O G (Feb. 5, 2020), https://
www.floridabulldog.org/2020/02/arsenic-and-old-sludge-a-hollywood-environmental-story/ [https://perma.cc/989L-V74G] (addressing controversial use of sludge
as part of “pilot soil management test program”).
241. See Reusing Cleaned Up Superfund Sites: Golf Facilities Where Waste is Left on
Site, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY at 44 (Oct. 2003), https://semspub.epa.gov/
work/HQ/174399.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF3H-TY9V] (describing four successful
golf course Superfund remediation projects to comply with Environmental Protection Agency).
242. See D. Zachary Hudson, Eminent Domain Due Process, 119 YALE L.J. 1280,
1293 (Apr. 2010) (“Yet, surprisingly, courts have not uniformly decided, and the
Supreme Court has never definitively addressed, what due process demands when
a state initiates an eminent domain action.”).
243. See generally Mark S. Dennison, Eminent Domain: Proof of Lack of Reasonable
Necessity for Taking of Property, 71 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 97 §§ 1-17 (2003)
(providing expansive overview of eminent domain law and how “necessity” is key
factor in litigation).
244. See City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764, 772 (Fla.
1974) (Roberts, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“The American people
dislike government regulation . . . and tolerate it only when they believe it to be
justified by compelling considerations of public good.”).
245. For further discussion of utilitarianism and deontological ethics, see
supra notes 153-160 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol28/iss2/6

38

Schmidt: Beyond the Green: The Legal Land Use Controls Involved with Golf

2021]

BEYOND THE GREEN

487

much fairness in the procedure itself to balance with the high level
of deference already afforded to the government in justifying its
taking.246
B. Keeping Score: Public Participation in the Zoning Process
The public’s demand in procedural fairness relates directly to
issues with the next-best land use control, zoning.247 Interestingly,
the South Carolina judiciary has not been as involved in the recent
zoning disputes throughout the state – at least since the 2013 state
supreme court ruling in Dunes West Golf Club, LLC v. Town of Mount
Pleasant.248 Considering that decision ruled against the property
owner by finding no Penn Central regulatory taking in the town’s
zoning amendment, perhaps property owners today would fare better if they focus their energies towards administrative processes at
the local board level before hastily resorting to the courts.249 While
zoning disputes certainly invoke legal questions of the legitimacy of
government exercising power, much of the tension results from social and political issues that warrant compromise among the
adversaries.250
246. See generally Eminent Domain Abuse Survival Guide: Grassroots Strategies for
Winning the Fight Against Eminent Domain Abuse, INST. FOR JUSTICE at 9-24 (2015),
https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/survival-guide.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K6TR-WK6D] (providing strategies for public to combat government’s
use of eminent domain through grassroots campaigns and legislative reform). Cf.
Cavarrio Carter, System Check: Balancing Texas’s Need for Natural Resources Exploration
with Texas Landowner Rights in Light of Texas Rice Land Partners v. Denbury Green
Pipeline-Texas, 2 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 309, 310 (2014) (highlighting landowners’ concerns in state abusing eminent domain power).
247. See Harvard Law Review Association, IV. Zoning and Procedural Due Process,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1502, 1503-04 (1978) (suggesting zoning decisions blur line between legislation and adjudication, and if such decisions deprive protected property interest, then procedural requirements include notice and hearing in front of
neutral decisionmaker).
248. But see Lucas High, Beaufort County killed plans for this Massive Bluffton development. Now it’s being sued., I SLAND P ACKET (Oct. 3, 2017), https://
www.islandpacket.com/homes/article176781216.html (reporting on lawsuit filed
by South Carolina golf course in response to county’s denial of rezoning application). For further discussion of the Dunes West case and its significance in takings
and zoning jurisprudence, see supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
249. See Dunes West Golf Club, LLC v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 401 S.C. 280,
321 (2013) (finding no taking in town’s zoning that “incidentally impacted [property owner’s] ability to maximize profit from the developing of its land”); see also
Taking Action to Reduce Planning Litigation Risks, MUN. ASS’N OF S.C. (Apr. 2020),
https://www.masc.sc/Pages/newsroom/uptown/April-2020/Take-Action-to-Reduce-Planning-Litigation-Risks.aspx [https://perma.cc/9UR3-L4D] (providing
strategies for governments to avoid litigation and identifying desired balance between individual and community rights).
250. See, e.g., McGlothlin v. Hennelly, 370 F. Supp. 3d 603, 616-17 (D.S.C.
2019) (applying libel standard to statements about golf course company owner’s
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Inherent in zoning disputes is the question of which community’s interests the decisionmaker should uphold foremost.251 As
courses continue to close, a simple suggestion of dispute resolution
is to give attention to those who are in immediate proximity to the
golf course and to prioritize those individuals’ interests first.252
However, recall that physical proximity may only be one among
many representative factors of the community at large.253 To assume that the immediate neighbors’ concerns should be prioritized
when the greater municipal community could have entirely different conceptions of the best use of the land could lead to shortsighted decisions.254 If the community believes in its sense of
ownership in the land at issue, it should be proactive in coordinating with government in deciding the necessary amenities or purposes to the land.255 This responsibility exists outside of the town
hall meeting, and this involvement should ideally come before the
issues of eminent domain or rezoning even appear.256 Considering
rezoning application); see also Arthur J. Anderson, Taking the Mulligan: The Land
Use Regulatory Hurdles in Golf Course Repurposing, 36 PRACTICAL REAL EST. L. 18, 2526 (Nov. 2020), retrieved from https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/taking-themulligan-the-land-use-17390/ (summarizing opposition to developments in two
South Carolina counties and concluding “numerous legal and political factors”
invoked in rezoning disputes).
251. See, e.g., Bradley Pough, Neighborhood Upzoning and racial Displacement: A
Potential Target for Disparate Impact Litigation?, 21 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 267,
271, 291 (suggesting zoning enables discrimination).
252. See Jonathan A. Wiley, The Impact of Commercial Development on Surrounding
Residential Property Values at 19-21 (Apr. 2015), https://www.gamls.com/images/
jonwiley.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7NC-K3N3] (using mathematical calculations for
zoning’s effects on property values to inform policy judgments).
253. For further discussion on common characteristics of the definition of
“community,” see supra notes 144-147 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Bos., 903 N.E.2d 593, 59798 (Mass. Ct. App. 2009) (noting dispute among immediate neighbors in board’s
granting of variances that “exacerbate the density problems [that Boston’s] zoning
regulations were meant to address”).
255. See, e.g., Michaela Winberg, How zoning works in Philly, and how you can get
involved, BILLY PENN (Sept. 14, 2018), https://billypenn.com/2018/09/13/howzoning-works-in-philly-and-how-you-can-get-involved/ [https://perma.cc/7RAZUVJ8] (suggesting Philadelphia citizen participation by calling Registered Community Organizations and attending Zoning Board of Adjustment meetings).
256. See Jessica Garrow, Public Engagement: The Key to Building Inclusive Communities, AM. PLANNING ASS’N (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.planning.org/blog/
blogpost/9113458/ [https://perma.cc/NC8C-KYCD] (describing engagement
strategies in regional planning commissions). This proactivity may yield better results in a broader planning process, which differs from zoning by providing a vision for community for which zoning is a tool to advance. See What is the
Relationship Between Planning and Zoning?, SHELBY CTY. DEP’T OF DEV. SERVS. https:/
/www.shelbyal.com/DocumentCenter/View/55/RelationshipPlanningZoning
[https://perma.cc/ZJ3W-LYW2] (last visited Jan. 5, 2021) (describing role of community planners).
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courts defer to the judgment of the legislative bodies in zoning disputes under the rational basis standard, community members
would find it in their best interest to ensure their concerns are
heard before conflict may even arise.257
Yet, for these members to know exactly what they want in their
community ahead of time may be an unreasonable demand requiring impossible foresight at times.258 Hence, the simpler route is for
government actors to guide the community planning process instead, with the help of the neighborhood planners.259 These decisionmakers on zoning boards should have consistent histories of
adjudications that yield net positive results, perhaps indicated by
political and economic success or positive intergroup relations in
neighborhoods where golf courses lie.260 The community members
have the reciprocal responsibility to monitor these government actors’ conduct, and decisions by board members or state actors that
are based solely on political or financial gain should raise red
flags.261 Concerned citizens should scrutinize whether the state ac-

257. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985) (noting general rule that legislation is presumed valid and will be sustained
if classification drawn by statute is rationally related to legitimate state interest).
258. See ULI Community Catalyst Report Number 1: Involving the Community in
Neighborhood Planning, URB. LAND INST. at 2, 4 (2005), retrieved from http://
uli.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Report-1-Involving-the-Community-inNeighborhood-Planning.ashx_.pdf [https://perma.cc/HG3K-KP27] (describing
community members as source of long-term “momentum” in collaborative planning, for which “[i]t is not possible to implement all the elements of . . . at once”).
259. See id. at 4 (placing responsibility upon planners to structure planning
process that allows for ongoing community participation); see also Massachusetts
Citizen Planner Training Collaborative, Roles & Responsibilites of Planning & Zoning
Boards Part I, CITIZEN PLANNER TRAINING COLLABORATIVE at 18 (2016), https://
www.hamiltonma.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Roles-responsibilities-ofPlanning-Boards-Part-I.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA4L-BZML] (listing responsibilities of planning board that include advising or coordinating with government, developers, and public).
260. See Patricia E. Salkin, Providing for Alternate Members on Planning and Zoning Boards: Drafting Effective Local Laws, 6 APA PLANNING & ENV. L., 3, 4-5 (Aug.
2009), http://mrsc.org/getmedia/6CFE1817-43AF-48E3-B885-ACB7B7EE65CF/
M58Salkin.aspx [https://perma.cc/98BG-KVVT] (describing zoning board member appointment strategies).
261. See Patricia E. Salkin, Ethics Allegations in Land Use Continue to Fill the Court
Dockets, 26 ZONING AND PLANNING L. REPORT 1, 1-3 (Apr. 2003), retrieved from
https://www.albanylaw.edu/centers/government-law-center/about/publications/
past-publications/Documents/Ethics%20Allegations%20in%20Land%20Use
%20Continue%20to%20Fill%20the%20Court%20Dockets.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KA64-V6UN] (noting cases of ethical considerations as applied to architects, attorneys, bankers, planners).
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tor may be misusing power or acting with malice, as may be indicated by these improper motives.262
Albeit, this monitoring process is easier said than done, and
individuals’ extent of influence upon government decisionmakers
could be extremely difficult to identify or evaluate.263 At the same
time, the appointment of a zoning or planning board effectively
calls upon these actors to choose the best outcomes for their constituents, which may entail tough decisions on finances, environment, public health, and quality of life.264 If all else, residents
could at least hope that the zoning board gives proper consideration to these factors, in addition to other principles of effective land
use planning.265 As applied to the South Carolina closures, the
most effective course of action to manifest the citizens’ hopes is for
them to appear in front of the boards and petition for consideration of these concerns, though results and effectiveness may vary.266
After the boards internalize this public feedback, government
actors then face basic utilitarian questions of what land use decision
will bring the greatest net benefit to the community; yet deontological principles should not be ignored in these processes.267 Government actors are in a presumably better position to protect
underserved or disenfranchised populations within the community
as mandated by deontological ethics, because they maintain sover262. See Dorr v. City of Ecorse, 305 F. App’x. 270, 277-78 (6th Cir. 2008)
(awarding punitive damages for mayor’s unreasonableness).
263. But see League of California Cities, Planning Commissioner’s Handbook,
INST. FOR LOCAL GOV’T at 5, https://www.ca-ilg.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/resources__PCH_sec1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q28L-W9WU] (last visited
Feb. 7, 2021) (outlining public service values that commissioners should
internalize).
264. See Patricia E. Salkin, It’s In the Cards: Ethical Considerations in Land Use for
Lawyers, PLANNING, ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.02[1] (2007), https://
www.albanylaw.edu/centers/government-law-center/about/publications/pastpublications/Documents/Its%20in%20the%20Cards-%20Ethical%20Considerations%20in%20Land%20Use%20for%20Laywers%20and%20Clients.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7TSG-BM4Y] (implying these considerations underlie issues of conflicts
of interest).
265. See APA Policy Guide on Smart Growth, AM. PLANNING ASS’N (Apr. 14, 2012),
https://www.planning.org/policy/guides/adopted/smartgrowth.htm [https://
perma.cc/JL53-VUHL] (identifying sixteen core principles of “smart growth”).
266. See Jerry L. Anderson & Erin Sass, Is the Wheel Unbalanced? A Study of Bias
on Zoning Boards, 36 URB. L. 447, 457-58 (2004) (questioning how particular interests of board members may stack against community interests).
267. See Spencer Gardner, A History of Zoning, Part II: The Problem Zoning Solves,
STRONG TOWNS (July 18, 2017), https://www.strongtowns.org/journal/2017/7/
17/a-history-of-zoning-part-ii-the-problem-zoning-solves [https://perma.cc/4679G2MT] (describing historical misuses of zoning to exclude populations and inferring immorality in non-priority of integrating populations).
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eign power over the people.268 However, mere deference towards
government’s rational decision making may not be enough to protect particularly vulnerable populations if their concerns are not obvious.269 Ideally, the government’s decision should result in an
improved quality of life for the populations who engage and make
their voices heard, and that cannot happen without continuous
public feedback.270 But even with robust public participation, governments are still imperfect entities that will inevitably ignore these
populations in some zoning or planning processes, or at worse,
make decisions that directly harm these populations.271 This risk of
further damaging already vulnerable community populations exists
within eminent domain use as well though, so in either case the
public shall remain vigilant as to whether the land use decision
skews towards an arbitrary exercise of state power.272
Altogether in balancing these issues of building trust in government, minimizing burdens upon community members, and internalizing public feedback, the ideal strategy in repurposing dead
268. But see State v. Peeler, 321 Conn. 375, 461 (2016) (Zarella, J., dissenting)
(describing “popular sovereignty” existent in American government, where “the
people hold the power, and the government has only the power the people delegate to it”).
269. See Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cty., Md., 48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir. 1995)
(citing Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)) (providing standard for government to pass Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause zoning challenge that application of law “must be ‘reasonable, not arbitrary . . . having
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation’”). This would imply
that government can, but is not required to internalize special circumstances for
its decision to pass scrutiny. See id. (requiring only equal application of law to
similarly situated persons, “[b]ut this does not mean that persons in different circumstances cannot be treated differently under the law”); see also Clayland Farm
Enters., LLC v. Talbot Cty., Md., 987 F.3d 346, 356-57 (4th Cir. 2021) (requiring
same standard for substantive due process zoning challenges, where state action
must have foundation in reason, and not be arbitrary or irrational exercise of
power).
270. See, e.g., Ind. Forest All. v. McDonald, No. 1:16-cv-03297-JMS-MPB, 2017
WL 131739 at *7 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (providing example of agency soliciting feedback for environmental analysis); see also Robert H. Freilich & Derek B. Guemmer,
Removing Artificial Barriers to Public Participation in Land-Use Policy: Effective Zoning
and Planning by Initiative and Referenda, 21 URB. LAWYER 511, 514 (1989) (highlighting electorate’s “ultimate control over land-use policy,” advocating for voter control over public policy).
271. See, e.g., Southern Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp., 67
N.J. 151, 173-74 (1975) (disallowing township to “make it physically and economically impossible to provide low and moderate income housing in the municipality”
through land use regulation).
272. See Dick M. Carpenter II, Ph.D. & John K. Ross, Victimizing the Vulnerable:
The Demographics of Eminent Domain Abuse, INST. FOR JUSTICE at 6 (June 2007),
https://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/Victimizing_the_Vulnerable.pdf [https://perma.cc/EMY3-DHKW] (providing data on eminent domain abuse adversely affecting minority and impoverished populations).
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courses should follow: government should invoke eminent domain
to the extent practicable to obtain the parcel.273 Asserting this land
use control foremost instead of opting for compounded regulation
thereby avoids the issue of whether regulatory takings occur, which
further minimizes the potential delay in litigating over the Penn
Central factors.274 Once this more perceivably harmful act is complete, i.e. condemnation and payment to the private owner, the responsibility shifts to zoning boards to secure the future use of the
property through the requisite zoning classification.275 While government would have discretion in defining the public use of the
property, community members could provide input on how to best
fulfill that vision of public purpose, either through participation in
zoning board meetings or even earlier in the comprehensive planning process.276 Through the state’s administrative procedure of
notice and comment, members of the public can ensure that the
ethical issues under either theory that may have arisen within the
community as they relate to the traditional role of golf in the state –
i.e. segregation, politics, class division, etc. – are actively being fixed
and geared towards a sustainable future in the community.277

273. See Matthew L. Cypher & Fred A. Forgey, Eminent Domain: An Evaluation
Based on Criteria Relating to Equity, Effectiveness, and Efficiency, 39 URB. AFF. REV. 254,
266 (Nov. 2003) (noting minimal project delay when municipalities employ eminent domain).
274. See Weiss v. People ex rel. Dep’t. of Transp., 468 P.3d 1154, 1160-61 (Cal.
2020) (describing distinction between eminent domain law where public entity
initiates complaint and condemnation procedure versus inverse condemnation law
where property owner alleges occurrence of government taking).
275. See Dep’t of Pub. Works and Bldgs. v. Ass’n of Franciscan Fathers, 360
N.E.2d 70, 75-76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (noting rezoning possibility after government
acquisition by eminent domain and how probability of rezoning affects calculation
of just compensation).
276. See, e.g., City of St. Charles v. DeVault Mgmt., 959 S.W.2d 815, 823-24
(Mo. App. 1997) (finding rezoning ordinances did not constitute amendment to
Comprehensive Plan and eminent domain use did not conform to Comprehensive
Plan).
277. See, e.g., Michael McCann, Why Private Golf Clubs Are Legally Still Able to
Discriminate Against Women, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 1, 2019), https://
www.si.com/golf/2019/07/01/private-golf-clubs-muirfield-augusta-women-discrimination [https://perma.cc/5HQL-ZGEU] (reporting controversies with maleonly membership policies in golf courses globally, including recently Scotland’s
Muirfield and Georgia’s Augusta National); see also Kadie Martin, So Much to Comment On, So Little Time: Notice-and-Comment Requirements in Agency Informal Rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act, 61 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT II.-132, 138140 (Apr. 2020), retrieved from https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol61/
iss9/14/ [https://perma.cc/JTX7-2973] (providing summary of federal notice
and comment rulemaking procedure).
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C. Joining the Club: Covenants as Compromise
Eminent domain can be effective as an active solution to the
issue of closed and abandoned golf courses, whereas zoning and
public involvement could be better used as damage control or as a
way to ensure that the property continues to have a beneficial
use.278 However, within the context of privately owned golf courses
and country clubs, government involvement is less effective as public access in the traditional sense is diminished.279 Therefore,
within private courses, covenants should continue to control the
land use disputes to the extent equitable; considering residents of
the country clubs are the likely core of the community, their unique
agreements that run with the land should be honored.280 Still, the
respective local judiciary can exist as an amenable legal forum when
needed to ensure these agreements are just and fair in operation,
demonstrable through “the mutual benefit of the owners of all lots
in the particular tract.”281
However, a common problem with covenants appears to be
how impractical they may actually operate in practice.282 The largest detriment with this situation in Arizona is the unreasonable delays.283 Perhaps a reform of covenant law is on the horizon, as
Supreme Court jurisprudence is especially lacking in this area.284
An affirmed bright-line rule perhaps analogous to termination of
278. For further discussion of effectiveness of eminent domain and zoning,
see supra notes 216-277 and accompanying text.
279. See, e.g., Quail Creek Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Hunter, 538 So. 2d
1288, 1289 (Fla. App. 1989) (finding “no state action” implicated in parties’
“purely private” covenant).
280. See, e.g., Canewood Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Wilshire Inv. Props., LLC,
515 S.W.3d 212, 218 (Ky. App. 2017) (upholding homeowners association’s retained right to enforce restrictive use on golf club facility).
281. Wallace v. Hoffman, 84 N.E.2d 654, 656 (Ill. App. Ct. 1949) (finding
resident’s right to enforce covenant under implied circumstances of mutual benefit); see also Save the Prairie Soc’y v. Greene Dev. Group, Inc., 752 N.E.2d 523, 52829 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (finding this “equitable right” of plaintiff who lacked
privity).
282. See Soc’y Hill at Piscataway Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Twp. of Pisacataway, 445
N.J. Super. 435, 450 (2016) (noting New Jersey rule that changed circumstances,
illegality of covenant, or voidness for public policy may make covenant impractical
or unenforceable).
283. For further discussion of length of litigation, see supra notes 201-210 and
accompanying text.
284. See Alisha Jarwala, The More Things Change: Hundley v. Gorewitz and
“Change of Neighborhood” in the NAACP’s Restrictive Covenant Cases, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 707, 707, 709 (2020) (identifying Shelley v. Kraemer as lead case controlling
covenant law, finding racially restrictive covenants violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Thomas Shepherd, A Shadow of Ohio’s Racist Past? Or a Lingering, Tangible Impact? An Examination of Unenforceable Restrictive Covenants, 48 CAP. U.
L. REV. 43, 48-49, 52 (2020) (acknowledging over seventy years passed since Shelley,
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trusts could fare well in situations such as these when the intention,
reliance, upkeep of responsibilities, and succession of ownership
devolve into flurry, resulting in years of mismanagement and battles
of expectations.285 Although property law generally aims to appreciate the uniqueness and irreplaceability of any parcel at issue, that
appreciation should not come at the expense of practicality.286
Yet, even if the law or covenant is well established or unambiguous in the case, issues remain whether the private individuals will
ultimately uphold their ends of the agreement.287 Even after the
litigation finishes and there is a judgment on the enforceability of a
covenant, the ensuing obligation remains upon the losing party.288
The Ahwatukee Lakes dispute in Arizona shows how willful neglect
of obligations may still persist, even in the face of court orders.289
Lastly, and perhaps to the chagrin of private country club community members, government can find its additional role in private
golf course management by enacting its own covenants with private
communities.290 These covenants would likely mirror zoning
but recognizing Congress extended protections against racially restrictive through
1968 Fair Housing Act).
285. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 410(a) (2000) (“[A] trust terminates to the extent the trust is revoked or expires pursuant to its terms, no purpose of the trust
remains to be achieved, or the purposes of the trust have become unlawful, contrary to public policy, or impossible to achieve.”). But see Piscataway, 445 N.J.
Super. at 450 (incorporating this already into its state law for termination of
covenants).
286. See James Simon, Civil Asset Forfeiture in Virginia: An Imperfect System, 74
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1295, 1328-29 (2017) (discussing value in uniqueness in real
property); see also Conservation Easements, WILDLANDS CONSERVANCY, https://
www.wildlandspa.org/conservation-easements/ [https://perma.cc/3AHM-LYP4]
(last visited Oct. 25, 2020) (noting benefits of conservation easements for landowner and neighboring community).
287. See 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 669 (“When performance of a duty under
a contract is due, a failure to perform is a breach.”). This leaves the question of
what remedies are available for breaches of covenants, which operate analogously
to contracts. See Wessel v. Hillsdale Estates, Inc., 200 Neb. 792, 800 (1978) (quoting Pool v. Denbeck, 196 Neb. 27, 30 (1976)) (“Injunction is an appropriate remedy for breach of restrictive covenants, a remedy at law being inadequate and
leading to a multiplicity of actions and the subversion of plan of development protected by such covenants.”).
288. See Swain v. Bixby Vill. Golf Course, Inc., 247 Ariz. 405, 413 (2019)
(granting resident plaintiffs injunction against golf course owner defendant’s failure to uphold covenant, reasoning “equitable considerations, such as the parties’
relative hardships, the parties’ misconduct, public interest, and adequacy of other
remedies”).
289. See Maryniak, supra note 203 (reporting golf course owner’s noncompliance with court order to restore golf use to property).
290. See Noah M. Kazis, Public Actors, Private Law: Local Governments’ Use of Covenants To Regulate Land Use, 124 YALE L.J. 1790, 1794 (Mar. 2015) (advocating for
balance between public and private law enforcement).
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schemes within the private community or some other exercise of
the government’s police power to prevent the lack of upkeep or the
threat of dilapidation, perhaps in exchange for select public services.291 In order for these agreements to succeed, there must be a
compatible goal between the private residents in the community
association and the local government, which should point towards
fruitful future use of the golf course.292 To further expand government involvement in these private communities, residents in support of preexisting private covenants or existing bylaws within the
community should try to obtain additional security through positive
governmental action, for example by petitioning the government to
use its regulatory power to shuffle the bundle of property rights
through rezoning.293 While such regulatory regimes may irk certain individuals with stake in the land, the deference would remain
to government to promote utility for the greater impacted community if the residents support the idea, and to ensure moral land use
practices exist within the community.294
V. THE FINAL HOLE: CLOSING REMARKS ON THE LAND USE
CONTROLS AND STATE OF GOLF
Each land use control discussed is useful in individualized
ways, and so the application to dead golf courses posits distinct sets
of issues in the respective communities.295 Eminent domain gives
the government more room to be proactive in its desired use of
land, and for this reason its use should be prioritized in the case of
dead courses that detract from a community’s value.296 Yet, govern291. See generally id. at 1806-11 (comparing and contrasting zoning to covenant enforcement).
292. See id. at 1804-06 (describing two New York City programs combining
zoning and covenants: one where City merged rezoning and restrictive declarations within its E-Designation program to “achieve the same result . . . to make
environmental remediation requirements easier for the city to monitor” and one
where covenant was added to public plaza space “to augment [the City’s] enforcement powers on a case-by-case basis” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
293. See David E. MacEllven, Land Use Control Through Covenants, 13 HASTINGS
L.J. 310, 310 (1962) (noting land subject to private restriction via covenants may
also be subject to public restriction via zoning).
294. For further discussion of utilitarian ethics, see supra notes 155-157 and
accompanying text.
295. For further discussion of how each tool operates in theory and for which
purposes, see supra notes 51-137 and accompanying text.
296. See Candace Taylor, Golf-Home Owners Find Themselves in a Hole, WALL
STREET J. (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/golf-home-owners-findthemselves-in-a-hole-11547135191 [https://perma.cc/889U-KJJK] (reporting dead
courses’ detriment to property values in surrounding residential community). Cf.
Patrick Sisson, Blight and vacant land are a national crisis for smaller cities, CURBED
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ment should not proceed recklessly as the practice carries high risk
of upsetting community members and leaving interest groups
deeply resentful for discrete losses of property ownership.297
Where the utility of eminent domain ends, ridding or repurposing
dead courses via zoning or planning amendments appears the most
well-rounded, non-offensive, and publicly accessible way to change
the land.298 However, the broad avenues for community input here
could let government have its way in the end if no consensus exists
between concerned citizens behind their advocacy, or if the government fails to satisfy the expressed community concerns.299 Lastly
for covenants, their restrictive use of golf course property will likely
prove more of an obstacle than a tool in transforming golf course
land, unless coupled with extra-governmental land controls geared
towards a compatible end.300
Though COVID-19 posits an uncertain potential shift in the
longstanding popularity of golf in the future, communities should
nonetheless understand the legal tools available to guide the sustained use of golf course property.301 Even though a golf course
may lie stagnant, change is abound as comprehensive plans update,
government purchases properties, private sellers pass to private buyers, and the law continues to expand.302 With this, the community
(June 25, 2019), https://archive.curbed.com/2019/6/25/18716105/blight-vacant-land-abandoned-property-lot-land-bank [https://perma.cc/4XWX-3CNX]
(noting abandoned property’s concentration in “areas that are losing jobs, investment, and economic opportunity,” and noting economic disparity within urban
areas where “[t]he winners get reclaimed rail lines. The losers get high grass and
weeds”).
297. For further discussion of how government takings may spoil relations
with the affected public, see supra notes 242-246 and accompanying text.
298. But see Ilya Somin, America’s Weak Property Rights Are Harming Those Most in
Need, ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/
2020/03/weak-property-rights/608476/ [https://perma.cc/A5WS-P65N] (noting
harmful effects of exclusionary zoning on poor, minority, and working class populations and potential for zoning to destroy more economic value than it may
create).
299. For further discussion of the allocation of responsibility between community members and government actors, see supra notes 251-266 and accompanying text.
300. For further discussion of ineffectiveness of covenants as a governmental
tool, see supra notes 282-289 and accompanying text.
301. See Candace Taylor, Before Covid, Golf Club Communities Were in the Rough.
Now They’re Seeing Green., WALL STREET J. (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/golf-club-communities-covid-11607528976 [https://perma.cc/QGN28LLB] (reporting surge in demand for residential golf club communities).
302. Cf. Major Golf Developments in 2020, NAT’L CLUB GOLFER (July 14, 2020),
https://www.nationalclubgolfer.com/news/major-golf-developments-in-2020/
[https://perma.cc/4Z4P-EDJ3] (claiming golf “is becoming more popular all the
time” despite challenges to industry).
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and government at large can at least work together to ensure these
legal tools bring benefit to the people as intended.303
Michael P. Schmidt*
303. For further discussion of how ethical theories can guide governments in
bringing benefit to communities, see supra notes 138-167 and accompanying text.
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